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SOLDIERS' LIABILITY FOR WRONGS COMMITTED
ON DUTY
UNDER AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
ALBERT EHRENZWEIG
1

The soldier is "liable to be shot by a court-maial if he disobeys an order,
and to be hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it.' 2 This paradox by Dicey
paraphrases a paradoxical legal situation: The soldier disobeys any order
at his peril,3 and is liable both civilly and criminally for any wrong
he may commit in obeying- such order. Although this patently unjust rule
has been "corrected" in many ways in its practical application, and probably has not caused too much injustice, 4 its reconsideration would seem appropriate at a time when it may unduly threaten ten million American
soldiers in the execution of their duties, and, by some of its unjustified
"corrections," unduly exempt thousands of enemy soldiers who may be
tried for their crimes.
The problem of soldiers' liability is not limited to wrongs committed in
obedience to superior orders. Any person injured by any military act may
look to the soldier' for redress and demand his punishment, although the
"wrongdoer" may have acted within the scope of that discretion and initiative
'The term "soldier" will be used in this article in its broadest every-day meaning,
as 2 including all members of the armed forces.
DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915) 299.
3
Under Article of War 64, 41 STAT. 801 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1536 (1940), a soldier
who "willfully disobeys any lawful command of his superior officer, shall suffer death
or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct." As to willful disobedience

of orders by noncommissioned officers see Article of War 65, 41 STAT. 801 (1920),
10 U. S. C. § 1537 (1940). Since "a command of a superior officer (as well asof a
noncommissioned officer) is presumed to be'a lawful command" [MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL (U. S. War Dept. Doc. No. 14a, 1927, rev. 1943) 149, 150], "an order
relluiring the performance of a military duty or act is disobeyed at the peril of the
subordinate" (ibid.). Moreover, even "disobedience of an illegal order might under
some circumstances involve .an act of insubordination properly chargeable under A. W.
96" [ibid., referring to Article of War 96, 41 STAT. 806 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1568
(1940), which concerns "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and military discipline."]. See also MUNSON AND JAEGER, MILITARY LAW AND COURTMARTIAL PROcEDURE (1941) 25, 29, 30. Section 8 of the Russian "DISCIPLINAtY CODE
OF THE RED Aaay" of October 12, 1940 requires the soldier to execute any order "without reservation." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COURTS MARTIAL LAW (1943) 5.
4
Where the soldier is not acquitted by the jury, he is likely to be indemnified for
his civil liability and pardoned for his criminal liability. Moreover, he may be held
only for nominal or mitigated damages, and will be excused from punitive damages.
Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss 13, 17 Fed. Cas. 380, No. 9,605 (C. C. D. Ind. 1871);
McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453, 461 (1874) ; Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 166

(1867); Carpenter v. Parker, 23 Iowa 450 (1867).
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which he was expected to exercise. While the policy problems here involved
are similar to those arising with regard to acts done in obedience to specific
orders, the two groups of situations have not been treated quite uniformly
by the courts and therefore require separate discussion.5 On the same ground
it will prove expedient to distinguish between civil and criminal liability,
and between the soldiers' liability to civilians and to each other. The usual
distinction between acts performed in time of war and in time of peace will
be replaced in this paper by the distinction between acts performed in
emergencies and under ordinary conditions,6 while the distinctions between
discretionary and ministerial acts,7 and between property damage and personal injuries will be abandoned as not warranted by the authorities. 8
The liability of federal soldiers is still entirely governed by the common
law. State legislation has never approached the problem and Congress has
acted only indirectly by isolated ex post facto immunity statutes and by
granting indemnity in certain cases to soldiers and to persons injured by
military acts. Only one state has regulated the liability of her militia in
federal service.0 Most states have enacted statutes wholly or partly abolishing the criminal and civil liability of the members of their national guards
or militias for acts committed while on duty in state service (infra p. 195).
The resulting discrimination between state and federal soldiers of itself
justifies a comparative analysis clarifying judicial and legislative approaches
to the problem. The result of this investigation is likely to gain additional
significance for the treatment of "war criminals" under international law.
5

Commands given by officers in the exercise of their discretion are dealt with in

this paper as "voluntary acts." See e.g. Note, Civil Liability of Officer to Civilians for
Acts of Militia (1910) 16 ANN. CAS. 1164.
6
These classifications of course, are not identical. On, the one hand, in peacetime
military acts are often performed under war conditions. See Note, Civil Liability of
Soldiers Obeying Commands of Superior Officers (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 646.
On the "extreme war-time theory of military action," see Note, Use of Military
Force in Domestic Disturbances (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 879, 883; WIENER, A PRACTICAL
MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW (1940) 28 ff. A declaration of "martial law" proper
seems to be provided only in a few states. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE
(1943) 96 ff. See also Fairman, Martial Rule in the Light of Sterling v. Constantin
(1933) 19 CORNELL L. Q. 20. On the other hand, a state of war does not necessarily
imply the existence of an emergency. See e.g., Note, Soldiers' Obedience to Orders
(1940) 90 L. J. 250, discussing the case of a lance corporal shooting at a recalcitrant motorist during an air-raid alert at the order of a sergeant. Rex v. Taylor, 90
L. J. 227 (1940). The court stressed the fact that war-time England was not under
martial law, but under the ordinary criminal law. See, also Note, Civil and Crimihl
Responsibility of Soldiers and Militiamen (1915) 53 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1141, 1163;
GLENN,
TnE ARMY AND THE LAW (ed. Schiller, 1943) 167, 173.
7
See infra note 56.
8But see RFSTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 146 which is limited to "invasions of interests of personality." See also IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933, Supp. 1943) § 451202; ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) § 197.
9
See infra p. 195.
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I.

TiE CoMMoN LAW
A.

Cisil Liability

1. Voluntary acts and orders
(a) Ordinary conditions-A voluntary wrongful act will not, as a rule,
be excused as occurring in the exercise of military duties even if committed
in good faith. A colonel of the New York militia who, on the erroneous
assumption that all muskets of his soldiers contained blank cartridges, had
ordered them to fire against a crowd of spectators, was held liable for injuries caused by such firing.' 0 The existence of a privilege to inflict harm
in the exercise of military functions, which was denied impliedly in that
case, was rejected expressly in another peacetime case where defendant
militia officer, who had ordered an encampment to be made on private land
without the owner's consent, claimed unsuccessfully that "private rights of
person and property are reasonably subservient" to "public operations for
the common defense."" That "no further damage was done . . .than necessarily resulted from the reasonable use . . ." was held irrelevant ;12

and so was the fact that defendant had "acted without malice or any actual
wrong intent." Good faith as a defense was generally rejected by the Supreme
Court in Bates v. Clark'5 where defendants, United States officers, were held
liable for the seizure of a lot of liquor about to be introduced into what they
' 0 Castle v. Duryee, 2 Keyes 169 (N. Y. 1865). This and similar decisions may, to
some extent, have been the result' of a certain hostility to the institution of the militia,
a hostility which is probably as old as that institution itself. See Colby and Glass,
The Legal Status of the National Guard (1943) 29 VA. L. REy. 839, 840. The same
attitude appears in Moody v. Ward, 13 Mass. 299, 301 (1916), where a horse, frightened
by the shots of militia troops, was killed in an attempt to escape. The court, while
holding for defendant officer on other grounds, said that the commanding officer might
have been liable for any damage caused by "the mischievous and disgraceful practice of firing guns in and near highways." For a statutory expression of this attitude,
see MINN. STAT. (1941) § 192.28, prohibiting "under penalty of dishonorable dismissal . . . the firing of blank cartridges upon any unlawful assemblage . . . under
any pretense or in compliance with any order." For authorities on the rights and
liabilities with respect to target practice in particular, see Note (1914) 31 ANN. CAs.
867. On the state militia in general, see BECKwITH, HOLLAND, BACON AND McGovERN,
LAWFUL ACTION OF STATE MILITARY FoRcEs (1944); Book Review (1944) 57 HARv.
L. REv. 593. The broad scope of liability may also have been due partly to the courts'
reliance on the liable soldiers' indemnification by private legislation.
1Brigham v. Edmunds, 7 Gray 359 (Mass. 1856). The court said that "such a
right cannot be exercised except inder the authority of the legislature . . . and with
suitable provisions for compensation." Id. at 363.
12But cf. Hough v. Hoodless, 35 Ill. 166 (1864), holding against a commanding
officer who had ordered the destruction of a building outside the military lines, because
such destruction was "causeless and willful," since the building could have been
easily moved on rollers.
1395 U. S. 204, 24 L. ed. 471 (1877).
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erroneously believed to be Indian territory protected by an act, of Congress.
The Court stated that their honest belief in their authority was "'no defense
in their case more than in any other, where a party mistaking his rights
commits a trespass ...."14
(b) Emergencies-The rule that acting on duty does not excuse unlawful acts or orders applies in emergencies as well as otherwise, apparently
even 'where a state of martial-law or of war has been formally declared.' 5
It seems, however, that in such cases good faith can be claimed as a defense. 16
While this was denied in an early New York case,' 7 the Supreme Court, in
a suit for -false imprisonment, held for defendant, who as a governor in
the course of putting down an insurrection, had detained the plaintiff
"without sufficient reason but in good faith."' 8 Morever, the existence of
a state of military emergency will be relevant in determining whether the
harmful act was lawful as an exercise of lawful discretion.'9
2.

Acts

1

erformed in obedience to military commands

(a) Ordinary conditions-The fact that the wrongful act was committed
under order has frequently been held not to affect full liability. In Griffin v.
Wilcox 20 a deputy provost marshal was held liable for false imprisonment,

though invoking an order to arrest anybody selling liquor to soldiers, because
141d. at 209, 24 L. ed. at 473. See als Fairman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 296; WIN(1920) 882 ff.; 36 AM. JuR. (1941) 265, n. 8.
14, at 889; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed
final draft no. 1, 1934) § 141, p. 337.
16For the English law, see Pollock, What ixMartial Law? (1902) 18 L. Q. REv.
158.
17Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 267 (N. Y. -1815), holding that good faith could not
excuse defendant who, 'without jurisdiction, had remanded plaintiff to custody; a decision held to be "most unreasonable" by the dissentirig judge. Id. at 271. Indeed, in
Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134, 14 L. ed. 76, 83, 846 (U. S. 1851) (see infra
note 30), it was held that in spite of good faith, the taking of private property in
wartime in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy, or for public
use, 'is unjustifiable in the absence of "immediate and impending" danger. This rule
has been accepted as the prevailing one by the restaters of the law of torts. See
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed final draft No. 1, 1934) § 141, p. 337 with authorities.
The present New York rule is probably represented by the more recent case of
Hawley v. Butler, 54 Barb. 490 (N. Y. 1868), where the court, holding for defendants in an action for false imprisonment, said that "where there is probable cause...
the officer acting without malice or bad motive, will be protected, if acting in the line
of his duty. . . ." Id. at 504 [Italics added]. Although the court did not expressly base
this holding on the existence of an emergency, it stressed repeatedly the prevalence of
a state of rebellion in the-country. Id. at 496.
'sMoyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S.78, 84, 29 Sup. Ct. 235, 236 (1908). See alsao Druecker
v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 628 (1867); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533
(1914); Hawley v. Butler', 54 Barb. 490 (N. Y. 1868).
19 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 146 at p. 340.
2021 Ind. 370 (1863).
THROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
15 See WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note
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even an order from the President could not justify an encroachment upon
the liberty of private citizens "in a State not in rebellion." The Supreme
Court in the case of Batesv. Clark-" made the similar statement that,
Whatever may be the rule in time of war and in the presence of
actual hostilities, military officers can no more protect themselves than
civilians in time of peace
by orders emanating from a source which is
22
itself without authority.
On the same ground the court in the case of Franks v. Smith2 3 held
for plaintiff in a.suit for false arrest against members of the Kentucky
militia, who had acted under unlawful orders of their superior officers.
Another line of authorities seems to favor, however, that more lenient
attitude which has been formulated in the Restatement 6f Torts with respect
to military "invasions of interests of personalty." Section 146 declares
"such an invasion by a member of the armed forces of the United States or
any of the several States thereof" to be privileged where it is "reasonably
necessary for the execution of a command issued by a superior, if the command is (a) lawful, or (b) is believed by the actor to be lawful and is not so
palpably unlawful that any reasonable man would recognize its illegality."' 4
The leading authority for this rule is McCall v. McDowell,25 where the
circuit court, 9th Circuit, holding for defendant in a suit for false imprisonment, expressed the opinion that "the law should excuse the military subordinate, when acting in 'obedience to the orders of his commander, ...
except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order is illegal."
The problem was again judicially examined in the Massachusetts case of
Neu v. McCarthy,26 where plaintiff, driver of a United States army truck,
was injured in a collision with defendant's automobile. The jury found that
2195
U. S. 204, 24 L. ed. 471 (1877).
22

d. at 209, 24 L. ed. at 473. For statement of the facts of this case see upra,
note 13.
23142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (1911). See also Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich.
299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924). For a list of pertinent decisions from 1774 to 1911 see
Brown, Military Orders as a Defense in Cizvil Courts (1917) 8 J. CGRIM. L.& CRImIN.
190. For further authorities see Notes, (1912) 25 ANN. CAS. 328, L. R. A. 1915A
1156; 6 C. J. S. (1937) 420; 36 Am. Ju. (1941) 265; see also WINTHROP, Op. Cit.
supra note 14, at 886; Flood, Martial Law and its Effect upon the Soldier's
Liability to the Civilian (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 380; Johnstone v. Pedlar, 90

L. 2 J.
P. C. 181, 2 A. C. 262 (1821).
4
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 146. See also HARPER, TREATISE ON THE LAWv
OF ToRTs (1933) § 59. For further authorities see, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Final draft
No. 1 1934) p. 330, Explanatory Notes; GIENN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 161.
251 Abb. 212, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235, 1240, No. 8,673 (C. C. D. Cal. 1867).
26309 Mass. 17, 33 N. E. (2d) 570 (1941).
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the accident was caused by the negligence of both parties. The court, sustaining the plaintiff's exception, held that if it was true that he had received orders from his superior to disregard traffic lights, such orders, though
illegal, "furnished a justification to the plaintiff for passing the red light,"
in conformity With "well considered cases" regarding "obedience to a military
order as a justification for conduct which would otherwise give rise to a
civil or criminal liability, unless the order is so palpably unlawful that a
reasonable man in the position of the person obeying it would perceive its
unlawful quality."

'27

(b) Emergencies-Both the strict and the lenient rule will be found in cases
involving acting in emergencies. The Supreme Court has never overruled
its decision in Little v. Barreme,28 where instructions from the President
were held not to exempt a ship commander from the payment of damages
for illegal seizure. Marshall, C. J., pointed out (without discussing
the question of good faith) that "the instructions cannot change the nature of the
transaction, or legalize an act, which, without these instructions, would have
been a plain trespass. '29 In the later case of Mitchell v. Harnony ° the
Supreme Court adhered to this principle even in a case involving military
acts under actual battle conditions. In that case an army officer was held
liable who, during the Mexican war, unlawfully forced plaintiff, a civilian
trader, to accompany the forces with his wagons, mules and goods in a
hazardous offensive expedition. The Court declared "upon principle, independent of the weight of judicial decision" that "it can never be maintained
that a military' officer can justify himself for doing an unlawful act, by
producing the order of his superior." 2 '
The more lenient rule of justification by order has gained particular importance in cases involving acts committed in emergency situations. In the
27

1d. at 22, 33 N. E. (2d) at 573. See Note (1941)' 36 ILL. L. REv. 361. See also
§ 146, p. 343, Comments, which draw a significant dis-

RESTATEMENT, ToaTs (1934).

tinction between commissioned officers, on the one hand, who are required to know
the contents of army regulations and general orders, and privates and noncommissioned officers, on the other hand, who are "entitled to assume that an order given
by the superior is permitted by the regulations or general orders." Cf. 16 ANN. CAS.
1164
(1910) distinguishing between higher and lower officers.
28
Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 2 L. ed. 243 (U. S. 1804). See also Christian Co.
v. Rankin, 2 Duvall 502, 87 Ait. DEC. 505 (Ky. 1866); GLENN, op. Cit. supra note 6.
at 2159.
9
Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, 179 2 L. ed. 245, 246 (U. S. 1804).
3013 How. 115, 14 L. ed. 76 tU. S. 1851). See also Farmer v. Lewis, 1 Bush 66, 89
Am. DEC. 610 (Ky. 1866).
31

Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137, 14 L. ed. 76, 85 (U. S. 1851).
it held sufficient in that case that the expedition was "undertaken from
patriotic motivest" See also Milligan v. Hovey, 3 Biss. 13, 17 Fed. Cas. 380
(C. C. D. Ind., 1871), where plaintiff, however, was awarded only nominal

Nor was
high and
No. 9,605
damages.
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32
often-cited case of Trammel v. Bassett, the Arkansas court, holding for
defendant soldiers who had carried away private property at their superior's
orders, seemed to recognize full immunity in acting under orders in time
33
of war. The- Montana court in Herlihy v. Donohue, on the other hand,
limited such immunity to obedience to orders of "apparent validity." While
under this rule which is stated as the prevailing one in Section 146 of the
Restatement of Torts, the existence of a state of emergency does not
affect the general principle of liability, this fact remains highly relevant in
discretion which determines the actual
the ascertainment of the scope of 34
or apparent lawfulness of -the order.
If the -person injured by the wrongful act of a soldier cannot recover
from the wrongdoer, either because the latter is financially irresponsible or
because he has acted in good faith under conditions of emergency or in
obedience to an order not'palpably unlawful, and hence is not liable, the
question arises whether recovery may be had against his superior. This
superior will be liable for a voluntary wrongful order given in the absence
of emergency or in bad faith. In other cases the applicability of the doctrine
of respondeat superior may be decisive.

3. Respondeat Superior
A master, under general principles of the 'law of agency,, may be liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior even for wilful acts of his servant.
Occasional attempts to apply this principle in the law of military tort liability
have been unsuccessful. Thus in a leading case 35 plaintiff, in an action for
false imprisonment against* the superior of two officers, contended that defendant "must be deemed, by relation, a party to the original arrest" since
"every officer and soldier was under his absolute command and control."383
The court, while holding for plaintiff on other grounds, declared that the
3224 Ark. 499, 504 (1866). See also Taylor v. Jenkins, 24 Ark. 337 (1866).
3352 Mont. 601, 612, 161 Pac, 164, 167 (1916), involving an order, unlawful
on its face," commanding the destruction of property.
"valid
34
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 146. Comments, id. at p. 344, pointing
that "where there is no immediately pressing necessity, as when the militia
called out to quell some minor local disturbance, it may be that the inferior is
privileged to obey an order which he would not be permitted to question during
prosecution of a war, . .

."

but
out

are
not
the

See also Ruan v. Perry, 3 Caines 120 (N. Y. 1854), where

the commander of a United States warship had seized a neutral vessel under instructions directin, him to send in vessels which, though coyered by neutral papers, were
suspected to be American. In an action for trespass the court held for defendant because there was no reason "to believe that the detention in the present cause was
(Id. at 122).
unreasonable."
35
Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N. Y. 1815).
36
1d. at 263.
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defendant's liability must depend upon his own participation in the act.3 7
It is more difficult to decide whether the doctrine of respondeat superior
is applicable where the military act complaiIed of was negligent. The
most important instances are those of traffic accidents caused by the negligence of a member of the armed forces. The English doctrine seems to be
clear. "Army authorities," rather than the military superior, are liable for
a negligent soldier as "an ordinary master at common law for the negligence
of his servant." 38
This question has been repeatedly litigated in this country under statutes
waiving generally,3 9 or for special cases, 40 the immunity of the state against
vicarious liability. It seems clear that militiamen are state "employees" or
"agents" for whose negligence the state is liable under such statutes. The
same theory underlies, those federal statutes and decisions under which
damages are frequently recovered for injuries sustained in accidents which
were caused by the negligence of a member of the armed forces of the
United States.41 '
However, in the recent case of Goldstein v. State,42 the New York Court
37

1d. at 265. A dissenting judge rejected the plaintiff's theory, "that a commanding
officer is responsible for every act of an inferior officer or soldier under his command"
as "a doctrine too absurd to require refutation." Id. at 269. See also Witherspoon v.
Farmers' Bank, 2 Duvall 496 (Ky. 1866), where the court held for defendant, Confederate officer, sued for damages by a bank, which during the occupation of Mount
Sterling in Kentucky had been robbed by his soldiers. Cf. Averey v. Bulkly, 1 Root
275 (Conn. App. 1800), where defendant's captain and lieutenant were held liable
for an assault committed by some of their company under circumstances indicating
that defendants must have known of it. See also BECKWITH-HOLLAND-BACON-MCGOVERN, LAWFUL ACTIoN OF STATE MmrrARY FoRcEs (1944) 65.
8Note, Road Accidents and the Forces (1941) 91 L. J.6, citing HoLi)SWORTH, HALSBURY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. But see Cleveland v. Harries, 32 App. D. C. 300 (1908),

where a commanding officer of the National Guard was held not liable for the negligent drowning of an enlisted man, because no negligence on his part was proved. No
attempt seems to have been made to invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior. See also
Howard v. Boner, 78 L. T. R. 3 (1943) ; Carolan v. Minister for Defence, 61 L. T. R.
2739(1926).
See e.g. N. Y. COURTS OF CLAIMS Acw§ 8; infra note 82.
°See e.g. Schmohl v. State, 141 Misc. 274, 252 N. Y. Supp. 474 (Ct. Cl. 1931),
where a claim by a member of the National Guard who had been disabled as a consequence of the negligence of an officer, was granted on the basis of a special enabling
act (N. Y. Laws of 1930, c. 818a) which had permitted a suit for damages sustained
"by reason of the alleged negligence of the state, its officers, agents or employees."
In Dicicco v. State, 152 Misc. 541, 273 N. Y. Supp. 937 (Ct. Cl. 1934), on the basis
of a similar statute, liability of the state was confirmed where a member of the
National Guard was fatally injured in a collision with a negligently operated trutk
of the National Guard. This case was citdd and applied in Spence v. State, 159 Misc.
797, 288 N. Y. Supp. 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1936). See also Di Marco v. State, 110 Misc.
426. 180, N. Y. Supp. 500 (Ct. Cl. 1920).
41
See e.g. Hebert v. U. S., 39 F. Supp. 267 (E. D. La. 1941), applying 52 STAT.
1398 (1938). See infra notes 81. 82.
42281 N. Y. 396, 24 N. E. (2d) 97- (1939).
4
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of Appeals, under a general statute permitting claims against the state for
"torts of its officers and employees," disallowed the claim for the death of
a militiaman in a traffic accident caused by his fellow militiamen's negligence,
because defendants were not acting in any employment of the state, but as
"citizens performing a public duty under the Military Law." 43
4.

Liability between members of the armed forces

Litigation between soldiers 'of equal rank is rare. The classic case of
Weaver v. Ward,,44 involving a skirmish between fellow soldiers "for their
exercise in're military" can hardly serve as a precedent and seems to have
had few successors. Suits of members of the armed forces against their
superiors for unjust or illegal treatment, on the other hand, ,have been
more frequent. In theory at least the rules governing such actions are the
same as those applicable to claims of civilians. The older authorities were
fully reviewed in Wilson v. MacKerzie,45 where a sailor was allowed to

recover against his commander for wrongful acts committed against him on
46
the high seas under the color of discipline.
43
This decision has since been followed in the case of Kennedy v. State, 16 N. Y. S.
(2d) 288 (Ct. Cl. 1939). See also Note (1943) 6 U. oF DTroiT L. J. 85; and Car-,
mody v. Davis, 241 App. Div. 88, 270 N. Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't 1934), where a
private car owner was relieved from liability for damage caused by his automobile
while in military use. The same thought would seem to underlie the statement in the
case of Spence v. State, supra note 40, where a member of the National Guard recovered against the state for the neglgence of a fellow soldier, the fellow-servant
rule not being applicable because the defendant and "the claimant were comrades in
arms:" But cf. Howard v. Boner, 78 Tr. L. T. R. 3 (1943).
There may be some doubt whether the Court of Appeals would uphold its interpretation at the present time. After the decision in the Goldstein casp, supra note 42, the
Legislature enabled the unsuccessful plaintiff by special act (N. Y. Laws of 1940 c.
,857) to file a renewed claim, and this statute was upheld as constitutional because
of the state's existing "moral obligation." Goldstein v. State, 175 Misc. 114, 22 N. Y. S.
(2d) 767 (Ct. Cl. 1940): In another case, decided shortly after the Goldstein case,
the Court of Claims allowed damages to an automobile passenger who had been injured in consequence of the negligent parking of army trucks by a detail of the National Guard, without the question even being raised whether the members of the
Guard were to be considered as "officers or agents" under the enabling statute (Laws
of 1934, c. 797). Gibbson v. State, 173 Misc. 893, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 405 (Ct. Cl.
1940). Yet, as long as the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Goldstein case is
not over~uled, the state is apparently not liable for damage negligently caused by
members of the militia, such persons being engaged in a public activity rather than in
the employment of the state. For cases in other jurisdictions, see Note (1944) 150
A.4 4L. R. 1456.
Hobart 135, 80 Eng. Repr. 284 (1616).
457 Hill 95, 42 Am!. DEC. 51 '(N. Y. 1895).
46
Ibid. "Whoever set themselves up in- opposition to the laws, or think themselves
above the law, will in the end find themselves mistaken." Lieut. Frye v. Sir Chaloner

Ogle, 1

McARtHUR, COURTS MARTIAL

(4th ed.) 268. See also Mallory v. Merritt, 17

Conn. 177 (1845); for further authorities see ANN. CAS. 1917 C, 8, 23. As to conflict of laws problems, see RoBINsoN, ADMIRALTY LAW (1939) 240.
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On the other hand, courts martial, even where not expressly declared
immune by statute, 47 are held immune if acting within their authority, even
though an error of judgment has been committed. 48 Frequently, a similar
result is reached with non-judicial officers by conceding to them a wide
range of authority and discretion in their dealings with their subordinates. 49
Thus in Schunieman v. Diblee,50 a soldier was not permitted to maintain
an action against the commandant of a garrison who, while holding him in
custody, inflicted upon him further punishment, the defendant's "will and
pleasure" being "his legitimate rule of conduct."
There seems to be some doubt as to whether this rule applies in cases
of malice. In the early leading case of Johnstone v. Suttonn' the court, speaking through Lord Mansfield, reversed a judgment for plaintiff naval officer
against his superior, and refuted the allegation of malice on defendant's part,
pointing out that "a man from a malicious motive, may take up a prosecution for real guilt." In the similar case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 2 however, the same court, while again holding for defendant, partly based its
decision on the absence of malice.53 In the modern American case of Gray v.
Moss1aln, 54 it was said, in a libel action by a sergeant against a captain,
that such an action could be based on malice. This principle seems to have
been adopted in many American jurisdictions. 55
In conclusion it may be stated that the soldiers' civil liability under the
common law is governed by the following principles:
47

MILITARY LAW § 141.
See e.g. Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150, 159 (N. Y. 1814); BURX EYER,
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW (1914) 569, 571. But cf. Capron v. Austin,
7 Johns. 96 (N. Y. 1810) where a militiaman, in a suit against the president of a
court-martial, recovered a fine imposed upon him for not having appeared at a military
parade. And in thq case of Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7 (N. Y. 1821) plaintiff militiaman recovered two oxen taken from him in collection of a fine by defendant, a deputy

48

See e.g. N. Y.

marshal of the United States, under warrant from the president of a federal courtmartial.
See also WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 14, at 882.
49
Great weight seems to have been given to the consideration that suits between
members of the forces shoulL be avoided to preserve discipline without which the
forces "would be a rabble, dangerous to their friends, and harmless to the enemy."
Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 T. R. 492, 99 Eng. Repr. 1215 (1786). For a theory of "quasijudicial" authority see GLENN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 156.
5014 Johns. 234 (N. Y. 1817).
511 T. R. 492, 99 Eng. Repr. 1215 (1786):
524 F. & F. 806, 99 Eng. Repr. 800, 814-815 (1866).
53See also Freer v. Marshall, 4 F. & F. 485, 176 Eng. Repr. 657 (1865), where a judgment for defendant in an action for the plaintiff's wrongful discharge was clearly based
on the defendant's bona fides.
5488 Conn. 247, 90 Atl. 938 (1914).
55
See e.g. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 7 How. 89, 130, 12 L. ed. 86, 125 (U. S. 1849);
aff'd 12 How. 390, 13 L. ed. 1036 (U. S. 1851). See also Notes L. R. A. 1915A
1157, 1167, (1941) 135 A. L. R. 27, 31; 36 AM. JUR. (1941) § 119; 6 C. J. S. (1937)
§ 35, 36, 37.
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(1) An unlawful order or act will not be excused because given or performed on duty under ordinary conditions in the exercise of free discretion,58 even if such order or act was given or performed in good faith, as
"a member of the military has no more authority to invade interests.., than
a peace officer."' 57 If, however, the order or act was given or performed
on duty under conditions of emergency, good faith seems to be a good
defense.
(2) Whether acting 'under emergency conditions or not, a soldier is liable
for wrongs committed in obedience to an order, if such order was "palpably
illegal." But, at least, where the order was "apparently valid," he will probably be excused under the modern rule. Liberally applied, this exception is
likely to become the rule.
B. Criminal Liability
The question whether a member of the armed forces is criminally liable
for acts done on duty is often confused with the jurisdictional question of
whether he can be prosecuted in the civil courts at all,58 or, if so, whether
he can be prosecuted in a civil court after having been tried by a court
martial.59 We are here concerned with the question whether a meinber of
the armed forces, if duly arraigned before a civil court, can be punished for
an act performed, in the line of duty, with or without a superior's order,
in war or in peace.
1.

Voluntary acts and orders
Authorities on the soldier's criminal responsibility for voluntary wrongful
acts done while on duty are scarce. In the leading case of United States v.
Clark,60 a military guard had shot and killed a guardhouse prisoner trying
to escape. Applying the rule of the "order" case of Riggs v. State, under
5
6The theory of Druecker v. Salomon, 21 Wis. 621, 94 Am. DEC. 571 (1867), denying
an officer's liability for false imprisonment because he had exercised an authority
discretionary rather than ministerial in character, seems not to have been followed
I
elsewhere.
57
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed final draft no. 1, 1934) 337 Ex. Notes; id.at
34258Ex. Notes.
Cf. United States v. Hirsch, 254 Fed. 109 (E. D. N. Y. 1918).
59
See e.g. People v. Wendel, 59 Misc. 354, 112 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Sup. Ct., Cr. T.
1908), where an officer, dismissed from the service upon conviction of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," was held triable for the same act in a state court
on an indictment of grand larceny. The court distinguished the case of Grafton v.
United States, 206 U. S. 333, 27 Sup. Ct. 749 (1907), where a United States soldier
who, while on duty, had shot and killed two Filipinos, and had been acquitted by a
court-martial, was succes'sful in a plea of double jeopardy before a federal civil court.
6031 Fed. 710 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1887). See als, In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (C. C. D.

Neb. 1900).
613

Cold. 85 (Tenn. 1866). See infra note 71.
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which any order, not showing its illegdlity on its face, protects the soldier
obeying it, the Court stated that:
...
the same principle would apply to the acts of a subordinate officer,
,performed in compliance with his supposed duty as a soldier; and unless the act were manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, or, in
the words used in the above case, were such that a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would know that it was illegal, that it would
be a protection to him, if he acted in good faith and without malice. 62...
Under this case it would seem that the good faith 'exception which in the
law of tort liability is probably limited to emergency situations, is generally
applicable in the law of criminal liability for 'voluntary acts and orders.
Here, as in the law of tort liability, conditions of emergency will further
extend the field of immunity by widening the scope of lawful discretion,63
except perhaps in cases involving members of state militias. 64

2. Acts performed in obedience to military orders
(a) Ordinary conditions-The law of criminal liability for acts committed
in obedience to unlawful commands has undergone a development similar
to that of the law of civil liability for such acts. 65 The strict rule,
denying immunity to the soldier in general, is represented by the
case of United States v.. Bright,66 where the Court held against defendant
soldiers who, in obedience to orders, with armed force, had prevented a marshal from serving a writ. In another case the jury had found that defendant,
'as a senfinel on board a man-of-war, had shot and killed a man on an
approaching boat which he had been told to repel. Althodgh he had assumed
an order to shoot to kill (he had been given both blank and ball ammunition), the judges found him guilty of murder, though recommending him
for pardon. 67 In a case involving the unlawful seizure, by Confederate' officers,
of persons held under court order,' it was said quite generally that "orders
of a military commander to his subordinates furnish to the latter no justification," although the subordinate "acts at his peril" in disobeying such orders.68
6

2
United States v. Clark, supra note 60, at 717. See also United States v. Carr,
1 Woods 480, 25 Fed. Cas. 306, No. 14,732 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1872). '
6See e.g. Price v. Poynter, 1 Bush 387, 89 Am. DEc. 631 (Ky. 1867).
64
See the authorities listed in Note, Use of Military Force in Domestic Disturbances
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 879, 893, n. 88; Manley v. State, infra. note 69.
6
, For a review of the English authorities, see Roberts, Some Observations on the
Case of Private Wadsworth (1903) 51 AM. L. REG. 63, 161.
6624 Fed. Cas. 1232, No. 14,647 (C. C. D. Pa. 1809). See also 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL
LAW
6 7 (9th ed. 1923) § 355; WHA~RTON, CRIM NrAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 376.
Rex v. Thomas, 4 M. & S. 442, 105 Eng. Repr. 897 (1815). See also United States
v. Bevans, 24 Fed. Cas. 1138 No. 14,589 (C. C. D. Mass. 1816).
6
SState v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627, 633 (1864).

1944]

SOLDIERS' LIABILITY

191

And where defendant militiaman, having received the' order to keep people
out of a certain inclosure "at all hazards," had killed plaintiff's decedent,
the court, while reversing the judgment against defendant on other grounds,
reasoned in part that even if the superior officer had "commanded at all
hazards, this would not authorize appellant to kill a person, or violate the
law, in order to do so. ... ."
A more liberal line of decisions was foreshadowed in Judge Washington's
decision in United States v. Jones,70 which limited the rule that no military
command will "excuse much less justify" an unlawful act, to cases in which
the subordinate knows or ought to know the illegality of such act. The
leading case is that of Riggsv. State,71 where the court, holding for defendant
on a murder charge, stated the rule as to illegal orders as follows:
An order given by an officer to his privates which does not expressly
and clearly show on its face or in the body thereof its own illegality
the soldier would be bound to obey and such order would be a protection to him.
This rule seems to have been generally accepted at least with regard to
orders directing the performance of a specific act.2

I

(b) Emergencies-While the older authorities seem to • /adhere to the
original strict rule, even in cases involving emergency situations, the modern
lenient rule seems to have been adopted for such situations at an earlier
period and to a greater extent than in other cases. Thus as early as forty
years ago, in the famous case of Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall,73 in which a member of the state militia on guard duty during a public
69Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Crim.
703 Wash. C. C. 209, 26 Fed. Cas.

Rep. 392, 399, 137 S. W. 1137, 1141 (1911)'.
653, No. 15, 494 (C. C. D. Pa. .1813). See also
Keighly v. Bell, 4 F. & F. 763, 805, 176 Eng. Repr. 781, 800 (1866); 1 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883) 206.
713 Cold. 85 (Tenn. 1866). See also Despan v. Olney, 1 Curt. 306, 7 Fed. Cas.
534,
No. 3,822 (C. C. D. R. I., 1852).
72
See Notes (1941) 135 A. L. R. 51 with authorities, and ANN. CAS. 1917 C. 8, 27;
36 AI. Jun. (1941) §§ 122, 123. The, law of New York is not clear. In Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 521, 523 (N. Y. 1814), the court held against defendant, captain of the
militia, who in violation of a statute had ordered out his company for military duty
during an election, overruling the defense of obedience to order which "would only
prove the colonel to be equally culpable." See Note (1941) 135 A. L. R. 41, proposing
a distinction between orders directing the performance of a specific act. and orders
directing the accomplishment of a general result. While it is admitted that practically
all cases deal with orders of the first class, and ,that the distinction does not seem
to have been urged, it is claimed as "reasonable that, while a specific order might
justify an act, a general one which left much to the discretion of the person to whom
it was given might not do so, for in the latter case the fear of punishment for disobedience would not exist to the same extent."
73206 Pa. 165, 55. Atl. 952 (1903). See also Roberts, Some Observations on the Case
of Private Wadsworth (1903) 51 Am. L. REG. 63, 161.
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disorder had shot and killed an innocent man, in obedience to an order to
"shoot to kill" anyone failing to halt when so directed, the court discharged
the defendant, whose "first duty was obedience" and who, in view of the
serious situation, had no ground "for doubt as to the legality of the order
to shoot."
While certain courts seem to have gone still further in establishing general
immunity for obedience to any superior order, the rule more generally ac.cepted seems to favor a limited immunity, excluding cases of palpable unlawfulness, thus approaching in effect the rule prevailing for all military
74
acts performed in the line of duty.
II.

STATUTES.

* The ideal solution of the problem of soldiers' liability, though at present
probably unattainable, would consist of a criminal liability rule exclusively
based on a policy of just punishment and effective determent, and a tort
liability rule primarily devised to procure indemnification to the injured person. Such indemnification could, according to the general principle of tort
law, be based on liability for fault and, where the injuring soldier was without fault or financially irresponsible, on the government's "enterprise"
liability7 5 for its agents.
The rule of government immunity and the common treatment of criminal
and civil liability have prevented, and in all probability will prevent for some
time to come, the development of a scheme approaching this solution. The
lack of government liability, where such liability would be the most appropriate means to provide indemnification, has caused an over-extension of
soldiers' civil liability, which in turn, because of the present interdependence
of the law of criminal and civil liability, has produced a criminal liability
74
See supra pp. 189 ff. See also Despan v. Olney, 1 Curt. 306, 7 Fed. Cas. 534, No.
3822 (C. C. D. R. I. 1852); and State v. Burton, 41 R. I. 303, 103 Atl. 962 (1918),
where a United States sailor was held not liable for a violation of the state speed
laws committed in obedience to an order, because such order "on its face was one
which was justified by the rules of war"; Noted L. R. A. 1918F, 599. See also BECKWITH-HOLLAND-BACON-McGOVERN, op. cit. supra note 37, at 66.
75See FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 313, who seems to favor a solution imposing
the burden "upon the public, . . . especially where the wrong is attributable to the
misjudgment or inexperience of the military agents whom the government has employed upon difficult duties." This type of "enterprise" liability, serving a loss distribution which under the present law is, almost wholly based on a theory of negligence
liability, has been discussed by the writer elsewhere as liability for "quasi-negligence."
Note, Loss-Shifting and Quasi-Negligence:-A New Interpretatwn of the Palsgraf Case
(1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 729; Study on Products Liability for Breach of Warranty
and Negligence (1943) REPORT, REcOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAw REV.
ColeM., 409, 455, n. 320. For a now classic criticism of the present immunity rule, see
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 3.
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of a strictness often violating the most fundamental principles of the penal
law.
Remedial legislation, which refrains from modifying the law with regard
to either the immunity of the government or the promiscuous treatment of
criminal and tort liability, has been limited quite generally to attempts at
removing the most conspicuous defects in the application of the common-law
rule of military liability: These statutes can be classified according to their
primary aim, as (A) securing indemnity to the injured person for his damage, or to the injuring soldier for his liability (indemnity statutes) ; (B)
granting immunity to the soldier (immunity statutes); and (C) offering
him procedural protection.
A.

Indemnity Statutes

Although any person held liable for acts committed in obedience to orders
may seek indemnity against his superior,70 litigation of this kind seems rare,
particularly in military cases,7 7 where such redress will of course be discouraged. For this reason and because no remedy is available to the soldier
who has been held liable for a voluntary act, only the government can effectively secure the soldier's indemnification, either by assuming the judgment
against him,78 or by reimbursing him for any payment made.79 Another way
to deflect the harsh effect of the present liability rule from the soldier is
to grant to the injured person a claim against the government. While this
solution has been chosen by many foreign countries,8 0 it has found but
limited application in this country. The most comprehensive relief based on
0

7 See e.g. Horrabin v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 549, 199 N. W. 988 (1924) where a
contractor recovered indemnity from city for damages paid by him for a trespass committed at city's request. And in United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83, 12 L. ed. 997
(U. S. 1850), the Supreme Court, in an action by the government on defendant
purser's bond, while rejecting a set-off claim based on the allegation of obedience to
the commodore's orders (because the government is not liable for its agent's torts),
conceded that the defendant might have recourse against the commodore. See Note
(1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 397. See also The "Mentor," 1 C. Rob. 179, 181, 165 Eng.
Repr. 141 (1799): "If a captain made a wrong seizure under the express orders of an
admiral, that admiral may be answerable in the damages occasioned to the captain."
77See Notes, Actidnas Against Military Superiors (1918) 62 SoL. J. 725 (with authorities), Remedies against Military Superiors (1919) 63 SoL. J. 586.
78 See e.g. 10 STAT. 727 (1852).
79See e.g. 22 STAT. 263 (1882); 5 STAT. 651 (1844). For older instances see The
"Actaeon,"
2 Rosc. 209, 213 (1815) ; The "Ostsee," 2 Rosc. 432, 451 (1855).
80 See the English Injuries in War (Compensation) Act, 4 & 5 Geo. V. c. 30 (1940)
CANADA REV. STAT. (1927) c. 132, § 7 (2). During World War I, the existence of a
similar statute in Germany was said to be "an interesting reminder that civil courts
there, as here, are guided by principles of law, rather than fancied military necessity."
Note, The German Supreme Court and Excessive Military Orders (1918) 62 SoL. 3.
322.
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this principle is probably that offered by those United States statutes which
authorize the government to pay, up to certain amounts, property damage
claims against government "employees" for acts done within the scope of
their employment,"' and by express definition include "enlisted men in the
82
Army, Navy and Marine Corps" as "employees" under these provisions.
83
Even the Federal Torts Claim Bill limits recovery to $7,500 and extends
only to non-intentional torts committed by members of the fores within the
scope of their duties, not in the course of war activities. In isolated cases
states have declared themselves liable for damages done to person or prop8 4
erty by members of their militias.
B.

Immunity Statutes.8 5

Since no general solution has been found which would give relief
to both the soldier and the injured person, mo~t statdtes have been limited
to mitigating the hardship imposed upon the soldier without regard to the
injured person's indemnification. While one group of these statutes provides
immunity for military acts in general, others are merely concerned with
acts performed in obedience to orders.
By an Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, any right of action was
abolished for acts done in suppressing the rebellion under authority of the
President. 6 An amendment of May 11, 18 66,87 added immunity for all
8142 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. § 215, 216 (1940); 54 STAT. 387 (1940), 31
U. S. C. § 223 (1940); 54 STAT. 365 (1940), 31 U. S. C. § 224 (1940); 49 STAT.
1136 (1936), 31 U. S. C. § 224a (1940); 57 STAT. 66 (1943), 31 U. S. C. § 224d
(Supp. 1943); 43 STAT. 939 (1940), 31 U. S. C. § 236 (1940); 49 STAT. 1976 (1936),
43 U. S. C. § 315g (1940). See also Note, Liability of the United States and Canadian
Governments for Tortious Conduct of Their Military Personnel (1943) 53 YALE L. J.
188, 192; MILITARY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES (8th ed. Advocate Gen. of the
Army, 1939 with Supp. II, 1943) §§ 701 et seq.; supra notes 39 et seq. Another important group of indemnity statutes is embodied in the Suits in Admiralty Act [41
STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 741 et seq. (1940)] and the Public Vessels Act
[43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. §§ 781 et seq. (1940)] See also Note, Responsibility of the United States on Maritime Claims Arising out of the Operations of
Government-Owned Vessels (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1189.
8242 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. § 216 (1940). See also the English Military
Manoeuvers Act 1897, § 6 providing for government compensation of "any damage to
person
or property."
83 H. R. 7236, S. 2690, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. (1940); 86 CONG. REc. 12025 (1940).
84IA Connecticut statute provides in part as follows:
The Comptroller is authorized . . . to reimburse in such sum . . . as shall be
deemed advisable, any person . . . for damages to person ,or property caused by
the act of an officer or enlisted man of the organized militia in line of duty....
85
This term is substituted in this paper for 'the usual "indemnity st4tutes" (see
e.g. FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 280 et seq), to distinguish this group of statutes from those granting indemnification to the injured person or to the soldier. See

also

BECKWITHE-HLLAND-BACON-McGOVERN,
86C. 81, § 4; 12 STAT. 755 (1863).
8714 STAT. 46 (1866).

op. cit. supra note 37, at 70.
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acts done under order of any military commanding officer prior to the
passage of the amending act. While the Supreme Court has never passed
on the constitutionality of these statutes,88 the fact that lower federal court
and state court decisions have been divided on this point8 9 may have prevented the more extensive use of this technique in this country.90
A second type of legislation also establishing military immunity for future acts, is that of Section 15 of the New York Military Law, which exempts members of the militia in the service of the state from both civil and
criminal liability for any acts done by them in the performance of their
1
dutyY
The New York law and all similar statutes, except that of Utah which
covers also "members of the militia ordered into the active service of the
• . . United States,"' 92 merely protect militiamen "ordered into the active ser-

vice of the State."93 This clause probably does not include members of the
militia serving with the federal forces. 94 The exclusion of such persons from
most state immunity statutes is of great importance even in peacetime. 95
At present, with the militia in war service, the scope of the immunity pro88
Cf. Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 4 Sup. Ct. 170 (1884) which upheld the
limitation of actions against military persons, but did not pass upon the prohibition
of actions against persons under military orders. See also FAIRMAN, op. Cit. supra
note9 6, at 279, 282 ff.
8 See GLENN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 180; WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW (1940); Randall, The Indemnity Act of 1863: A Study ip the Wartime
Immunity
of Governmental Officers (1922) 20 MICH. L. REv. 589.
90
But see 33 STAT. 2249 (1903) ratifying "all acts of the United States in Cuba
during its military occupancy thereof," and thus exonerating officers acting for the
United States. O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U. S.45, 52, 28 Sup. Ct. 439, 441
(1907). Cf. 40 STAT. 532 (1918), 5 U. S. C. § 210 (1934) which, while providing for
indemnity to inhabitants of allied countries for damages caused by American military
forces during World War, expressly declares not to "diminish responsibility of any
member of the miliiary forces to the person injured." For a state ex post facto immunity statute see the Rhode Island statute applied in Despan v. Olney, 1 Curt. 306, 7
Fed. Cas. 534, No. 3,822 (C. C. D. R. I. 1852). For a history of English legislation
see FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 280, 281.
OlAs
to the constitutionality of this type of provision see infra note 149.
92
UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) tit. 54, C. 1, § 11.
93

Provisions regarding the state militia are not generally so restricted. See e.g.
MILITARY LAW, §§ 235 [cf. State v. Campbell, 40 N. Y. 133 (1869)], 246, 246a,

N. Y.
301.9 4

See Brown v. State, 195 So. 52 (La. App. 1940) where the state was held not
liable for negligent driving on duty by a member of the National Guard in federal
service. For the converse problem concerning the status' of federal army instructors
serving with the militia, see WIENER, supra note 89, at 41.
95
See Colby and Glass, The Legal Status of the National Guard (1943) 29 VA. L.
REv. 839, 846. See in general, Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia
(1917) 26 YALE L. J. 47; THE MILITIA LAW OF NEW YORK (1862); ScoTT, An
ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE MILITIA LAWS OF THE UNITED

STATES

(1873).
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vision seems to be practically limited to the reserve militia and to certain
auxiliary bodies acting as state forces. 96
Military immunity statutes have been enacted in thirty-four states and
territories. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Virginia have immunity statutes substantially identical
with that of New York. 97 North Dakota98 limits the applicability of the
statute to acts done in case of, or to prevent, insurrection, riot or invasion,
by so defining the term "active service" for the purposes of this provision.
This rule seems to be based on that of the British Riot Act which has been
adopted in substance by Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey
and West Virginia.9 9 The Illinois -statute0 0 further restricts military immunity to criminal prosecution for the killing and wounding of persons in
an effort to suppress unlawful assemblies, while Wyoming' l merely protects
members of the State Guard and Kansas and Missouri 0 2 simply put military persons on the same footing as officers of the peace. Maine and Mississippi, 10 3 on the other hand, expressly include under their immunity rule
acts which, though not having been performed on duty, were done in obedience to the command of a superior (infra). Arizona, California and Minne04
sota immunize the exercise of honest judgment by a commanding officer.
The statutes of Montana and Washington deny action against any officer
96

See e.g. N. Y. MILITARY

LAW

§§ 5a, 40, 43; Bacon, The Model State Guard Act

(-1941) 10 FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 41; Glass, National Guard Reserve-Inactive National
Guard
(1944) 30 VA. L. REv. 331.
7

0 ALA. CODE (1940)
tit. 35, § 118; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 9178; CAL.
MILITARY AND VETERANS CODE (Deering, 1943) § 392; FLA. STAT. ANN. (1941) §
250.41; HAWAII REV. LAWs (1935) § 7838; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 45-402; Ky.
REv. STAT. (1942) § 38.480; MD. ANN. CODE (1939) art. 65, § 51; NEE. ComP. STAT.
(1929) §§ 55-150; NEv. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 7165; N. J. STAT. ANN.
(1940) (tit. 38, C. 12-6); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. (1941) § 66-402; ORE. ColdP LAWs
ANN. (1940)
§ 103-246 ("while on duty"); R. I. PUBL. LAWs (1939-40) tit. 10,
§ 202; VA. CODE (1942) c. 106, § 2673 (85). Many states have enacted special privileges regarding the observation of traffic regulations. See e.g. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope,
1937) § 9285; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 287, § 32. As to exemptions from licensing

regulations, see Kennedy, Military Motor Driving (1932) 1 S. AFR. T. 150.

98N.'D. LAWS (1941) c. 221, § 11.
99
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) c. 42, § 801; GA. CODE ANN. (Park, Skillman & Strozier,
1937) § 86-1305; N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 143, § 80; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939)
(Tit.
2, c. 152-6); W. Va. CODE (1943) § 1184.
100 ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) § 197.
'o1WYo.
0 2

LAWS

(1941), c. 63, § 9 (b).
(Corrick Supp., 1941)

IAN. GEN. STAT.

15039.
3

§ 48-512; Mo. REv.

STAT.

(1939)

§

10 ME. RIv. STAT. (1930) c. 18, § 14; MIss. CODE (1930) c. 136 § 5542.
10 4
ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) § 64-223; CAL. MILITARY AND VETERANS CODE (Deering,
1937) § 336; MINN. STAT. (1941) § 192.27.
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or soldier for acts committed in obedience to an order though such order
"may hereafter be held invalid by 'any civil court."' 1 5 Similarly, the Utah
statute, though using substantially the same language as the New York
statute, merely protects acts done by members of the militia in line of duty
in pursuance of orders from a superior authority. 10 6 Minnesota, Florida and
Kentucky, by further limiting the immunity provision' to acts done under
lawful orders and in the performance of duty, probably fail to establish an
10 7
immunity rule different from that of the common law.
Certain civil law statutes applicable to the criminal liability for acts done
in obedience to military orders have established a rule of general immunity.
While, e.g., the Penal Code for the Philippine Islands absolves of criminal
liability only persons acting in obedience to "orders issued by a superior
for some lawfil purpose,"' 08 the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico provides that "he who acts by virtue of obedience due another," is "not delinquent and . . .therefore exempt from criminal liability."'1

9

And Subdivision

3 of Article 20 of the Preliminary Project of an Italian Penal Code provides that an act is justified as to its penal effects if performed "on an
obligatory order of the competent authority" (per ordine obbligatorio dell'
autoritel competente) .110
It has been pointed out that the Restatement of Torts has adopted a
limited immunity rule for wrongs committed in the execution of orders not
manifestly unlawful."' While-it may be doubted whether this rule represents the prevailing common law rule, several states have embodied a
similar rule in their statutory laws and several civil law codes contain
provisions to a similar effect concerning acting on orders in general.
A recent Massachusetts statute provides for the, criminal and civil immunity of officers and soldiers for acts done or orders given in obedience to
orders "unless the act or order causing such injury was manifestly beyond
the scope of the authority of sitwh officer or soldier."'n 2 And the Wyoming
statute, including all acts "committed in the performance of . . . necessary
05

'

MONT. REv. CODES ANN.

§ 8473.
10

6UTAH CODE

07

§ 1347;

(1943) Tit. 54, c. 1, § 11.

WASH. R V. STAT. (Remington, 1932,

MINN. STAT. (1941) § 192.27; FLA. STAT. (1941)
37.260. BECKWiTH-HOLLAND-BAcoN-McGvERN op.

1

§

(1936)

§ 250.41; Ky. REv. STAT. (1942)
cit. supra note 37, at 71, seem

to favor an interpretation of all immunity statutes in this sense.
08
1 REv. PEN. CODE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (1932) art. 11, subd. 6.
09
official translation, War Department 1900.
1 0

'

RELAZIONE SUL PROGETTO PRELIMINARE DI CODICE PENALE ITALIANO

note 24.
1"llSupra
12
MASs.

LAWS (1939)

Italics added.

c. 425 § 1, MASS. ANN. LAws. (Supp. 1942)

(1921).

c. 33, 24.
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duties incident to service," limits its immunity rule to acts "iiot palpably
illegal, excessively violent, or nalicious.""8
While containing a similar limitation to acts not manifestly unlawful,
the following provision of ,the Penal Code of Costa Rica avoids any difficulty that might arise from the use of the term "illegal." Article 32 of
that Code declares he is not responsible for his acts
. . . who has acted.

.

.

.

in executing an order of the competent

he believed or should have believed to be under
authority as to which 114
an obligation to obey.
A similar rule has been adopted by the Mexican law, providing that penal
responsibility is excluded where the actor'
obeys a legitimate hiefarchical superior, although his order constitutes
is not notorious or it is not proved that
a crime if such circumstance
the accused knew it."15
Another intermediate solution between full immunity an4l full liability
6
has been proposed by Ballantine in his Draft of a State Military Code."1
He suggests, in effect, that a presumption of immunity should be established
for acts of militiamen in quelling an insurrection, rebuttable by the proof
"that such acts were . . . outside the scope .of . . . orders . . . or . . .not
done in good faith .
C.

Procedural Statutes

Jurisdictionalprivileges.
Several jurisdictions, not limiting themselves to granting immunity for
118
promilitary acts, either, like the District of Columbia and Louisiana
hibit generally the prosesution of militiamen for acts done on duty, or,
like Indiana and Michigan" 9 only for acts done in obedience to orders.
1.

c. 63 § 9(b). Italics added.
"140wn translation from CODIGO PENAL DE LA R PUBLICA DE COSTA RICA (ed. Her11WYo.'LAWS (1941)

manos, 1924), art. 32.

115COMPENDIUM OF THE LAws OF MEXICO (Transl. Wheless, 2d ed. 1938) art. 996,
subd. 7. See also the pre-nazi GERMWAN MILITARY PENAL CODE § 47 (2), infra note 192;
and § 17 of the Draft of a Civil Wrongs Bill, prepared for the Government of India;
POLLOCK, TORTS (13th ed. 1929) 633.
6
"I Draft of a State Military Code for the Government of the 'Organized Mititia
in their Relations 'with Civilians, proposed by Henry W. Ballantine, Qualified Martial
Law, A Legislative Proposal (1916) 14 MIcH. L. REv. 102, 118, 197, 213.
1171d. at 118, § 13. On the other hand, this code would expressly provide not only
that members of the militia are responsible to the civil courts (Id. at 215, § 5),

but that a special military board shall inquire into any wrong done to civilians and
and enforce reparation (Id. at 217, §§ 3, 4).
impose
8

"1 D. C. CODE (1940)

Tit. 118, § 39-705; LA. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1942) § 4505.31.

119 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1943)

§ 45-1202; MIcir. STAT. ANN.

Supp. 1942) § 4.633. Sed also BRITISH ARMY AcT, § 144.

(Fiske,
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In addition, most jurisdictions have
enacted statutes exempting members
1 20
of their forces from civil process.
Article 74 of the Articles of War exempts soldiers to some extent from
civil jurisdiction "in time of war" 121 and both Congress and state legislatures
have, in soldiers' civil relief acts, established various other procedural privileges.12? Moreover, under Article 117 of the Articles of War 122 1 "any civil or
criminal prosecution . . . against any . . . person in the military service of

the United States on account of any act done under color of his office or
status" may be removed into the federal district court.
2.

Public defense.

.Many states have, in various ways, made provision for the defense at
public expense of members of their militia in actions or,prosecutions for
acts done on duty! California, Maine, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma
and South Dakota provide for defense by a state officer,'2 while under
the statutes of Minnesota, Rhode Island, Nevada and Wisconsin the governor will appoint private counsel for the defense. 124 Only the South Dakota
statute requires the 'defendant to refund the costs paid by the state upon
collection of the judgment.' z
3. Security for costs.
At least nineteen states (Arkansas, California, Idaho, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
12 0 See e.g. N. Y. MILITARY LAW § 235; ALA. CODE (1940) tit.35, § 106; Axx.
DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 9282; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1942) c. 111;
GA. CODE ANN. (Park, Skillman & Strozier, 1937) § 86-702; DEL. REv. CODES (1935)
c. 287, § 32. For a recent synopsis and discussion of other exemptions from civil
process in New York statutes, see Family Fin. Co. v. Starke, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 858
(Sup. Ct., Sp. T., N. Y. Co. 1942). See also The War Power and the Government
of Military Forces (1916) 7 J. CRIm. L. & CRimn.,246, 405, 555, 414 et seq; Note,
Service of Process on Members of the Armed Forces (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 364.
12141 STAT. 803 (1920),
10 U. S. C. § 1546. (1940). As to the "middle of the
road policy" observed in practice, see Monroe, WhenI a Soldier Breaks the Law
(1942)
33 J. Cmri. LAW AND CRimIn. 245, 249.
1 22
For a recent discussion see e.g. Skilton, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940 and the Amendments of 1942 (1942) 91 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 177. See also
Schmehl, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940: A Survey and Bibliography
of Books, Articles and Cases (1942) 35 L. LIB. J. 187.

122141 STAT. 811 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1589 (1940).
12 3
CALIFORNIA MILITARY AND VETERANS CODE (Deering, 1937) § 393; ILL. Rsv. STAT.
(St. B. A. 1943) c. 129; § 201; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 12. § 14; MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 1347; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1940) tit. 38, c.
12-7;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. c. 4, tit. 44, § 212; S.D. CODE (1939) § 41.0181.
24
1 MINN. STAT. (1941)
§ 192.28; R. I. LAWS (1939-40) c. 350, tit.10, § 203; Nav.
ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 7165; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 21.14.
125S. D. CODE (1939) § 41.0181.
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York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island; South Dakota,
-Utah, Washington and West Virginia) require the plaintiff, in any civil
or criminal 26 action against a soldier or officer for any act done on duty,
to file security for the payment of costs. 12 7 In West Virginia the right to

security is conditioned upon its being made "to appear to the court by
affidavit or otherwise" that the act was one done on duty.1 28 Several states
have established minimum amounts for the required security ($100 in California and Oklahoma; $200 in Montana and Washington; $500 in West
Virginia)

4.

.'-

Treble costs.

As a further protection against unjustified claims, the statutes of nine
states (Idaho, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and West Virginia) give treble costs to the
successful defendant soldier. 130 South Dakota imposes a penalty of double
costs and such additional attorneys' fees as the court shall allow, 131 while
Great Britain and New Zealand only permit the recovery of reasonable
costs. 132 The justification of the ihstitution of multiple damages and costs
133
in general itla modern legal system has been discussed elsewhere.
5. Pleading military privilege after general denial.
The statutes of at least nine states (California, Maine, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, West.Virginia) lz and of New Zealand 35 contain a peculiar procedural privilege. Under
12 6See e.g. N. Y. MILITARY LAW § 15, which gives the right to require security for

costs in "an faction or proceeding of any nature," thus apparently including criminal
actions. See N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. §§ 5, 119, 720; O'Connor v. Walsh,. 83 App.
Div. 179, 183, 82 N. Y. Supp. 199 (2d Dep't 1903); 11 CARMaODY's NEW YORK PRACTICE (1931) § 158. § 15 may also permit the imposition of costs upon complainants or
private prosecutors before the magistrate. People v. Kranz, 63 Misc. 146, 118 N. Y.
Supp. 499 (Co. Ct., Chautauqua Co. 1909); 2 BIsHop's' NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(1913)
27

543 f.

1 See supra notes 97 et seq.; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN.
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1943) § 1191.
128W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1943) § 1191.

(Remington, 1932) § 8473;

'"Supra note 123.

13oSnpra notes 97 et seq. In New York, this rule which dates back to REv. STAT.
(1829) c. X, tit. IX, § 6, was interpreted in Walker v. Burnham, 7 How. Pr. 55
(N.31 Y. 1852) to apply to defendant civilians acting under military orders.
113 2Supra note 125.

BRiTIsH ARMY ACT, § 144; NEW ZEALAND ARMY AcT § 94 (3).
laaStudy, Multiple Damages (1944) REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS
N. 34Y. LAiv REv. Comm.

11 35 Snpra notes 97 et seq.

NEw ZEALAND ARMY AT, § 94 (2).
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a general denial the defendant may introduce only such evidence as will contradict what the plaintiff is bound to prove to make out his case. 3 6 Since
acting on duty would probably be considered as an affirmative matter and,
therefore, as not provable by plaintiff, the defendant militiaman could not
prove this fact under a general denial except under an express -statutory
provision. In fact, the statutes of the above-mentioned jurisdictions expressly grant the privilege that a defendant militiaman "in all cases may
make a general denial and give the special matter in evidence."
III.

THE PROBLEM

A. Summary and Controversy
The present state of the law can perhaps be summarized as follows:
The common law of military liability is applicable to members of the armed
forces of the United States and to those militiamen whose states have
not enacted immunity statutes. Older authorities rarely deviated from the
stringent principle of full liability for illegal acts, with regard to either
civil or criminal liability, whether sush acts were committed under order
or voluntarily, under ordinary conditions or in emergencies.' 3 7 A more
recent tendency seems to develop a rule of immunity for acts committed
in good faith, a rule which in civil cases may be limited to emergency situations and to acts committed in obedience to "apparently" valid orders. In
derogation of the common law rule the militia statutes of most states have
completely or partly immunized members of the militia for acts performed
on duty.
Literary discussions evaluating judicial and lay opinions on the question
of military liability are scarce. In favor of a rule of full soldier's immunity
it is usually claimed that a legal rule holding the soldier liable for acts
done in compliance with unlawful orders will create undue hardship to the
soldier and undermine military discipline. Under such a rule the soldier
will have to choose, in cases of doubt, between disobeying the order, thus
exposing himself to severe military punishment and turning every camp into
"a debating school,"' 38 and obeying the order at his peril in precarious reliance on "a possible indemnity from a benevolent legislature or a pardon
from a sympathetic pardoning power.' '139 The injustice of this rule. is
13 6See 3 CARMODY'S N. Y. PRActiCE (1931) § 983.
137ft has been pointed out, however, that the existence of an emergency may determine the scope of permissible discretion as well as the assumption of a state of coer-

cion. For jurisdictions limiting statutory immunity to certain emergency situations,
see 38supra notes 98, 99, 100.
' 39 McCall v. McDowell,'l Abb. 212, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235, No. 8,673 (C. C. D. Cal. 1867).
' Ackerly, Legal Responsibility of Obedient Soldier r Militiaman (1916) 22 CAsE
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not outweighed by a corresponding interest of the injured person who may
obtain satisfaction from the really responsible officer 1 40 or from the government.' Nor, are these objections removed by those decisions and statutes
which deny liability for acts performed in obedience to orders not clearly
illegal. Even such limited liability would impair strict obedience and, besides,
would depend upon the varying judgment of particular courts and juries.
Moreover, even obedience to a palpably illegal order may be excusable if
compelled.
The adherents of a rule of full liability, on the other hand, insist that
immunity "would be subversive of civil liberty and would place the military,
before the civil power.' 41 Thus Owen J. Roberts, now Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, concluded his much-cited article
on the case of Private Wadsworth with the warning that when "you make
a rule that orders justify, you paralyze the arm of the civil law, and render
it possible to cloak the vilest abuses of power under the pretence of a
superior's commands.' 4 2
The intermediate "palpable unlawfulness" rule of the Restatement of
Torts 43 would satisfy the adherents of the present system of full liability
no more than the advocates of an, immunity rule. It is claimed that this
rule is not only too uncertain in application but -unjust with regard to
both the defendant and the plaintiff. It is unjust with regard to the defendant in exempting subordinates of supernormal understanding and discriminating against those of subnormal undergtandingl and it is unjust with
regard to the plaintiff in requiring him, possibly by a chain of unsuccessful
suits, to ascertain the officer originally responsible for the unlawful order
or act, while he could prosecute his claim against the subordinate without
"any appreciable injury to the public service.'1 44 Uncertainty has also been
stressed as an argument against similar proposals regarding soldier's crimAND COMMENT

739, 743. See also Turney, Civil and Criminal Accountability of Mem-

bers0 of the Army and Navy (1917) 24

CASE AND COMMENT

297, 300.

14 McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abb. 212, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235, No. 8,673 (C. C. D. Cal.
1867). See also WIENER op. cit. supra note 89, at 151: "colonels are more solvent than
privates."
141J. G. White (1917) 24 CASE AND COMMENT 499. See also Balfantine, The Effect
,of War on Constitutional Liberty (1917) 24 CASE AND COMMENT 3; Brown, Military
Orders as a Defense in Civil Courts (1917) 8 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMIN. 190. See also
Brown, Military Order as a Defense in Civil Courts (1918) 3 VA. L. REv. 641. This
argument has been refuted as "unfair and unreasonable" in view of age-old experience
with
the judiciary which has never abused its immunity.
142 Roberts, op. cit. supra note 65, at 174.
3
14 Supra note 24. This rule is advocated in Note, Civil Liability of Soldiers Obeying
Com mds of Superior Officers (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REV.646.
144Brown, op. cit. mpra note 141, at 192.
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inal liability. Moreover, it is feared that much undesirable immunity would
be produced under such a rule by the difficult provability of oral orders,
as well'as by the prohibitions against self-incrimination and against conviction in cases of reasonable doubt.145
Adherents of full soldiers' liability are generally satisfied with considering any resulting hardship as "one of the risks of the business"' 14 6 or with
the expectation that such hardship will be removed in civil cases by the
soldier's right to reimbursement by his superior officer or by his government, and in criminal cases by nolle prosequi and pardon. 14 7
B.

Analysis nd- Possible Solution

Statutory action can probably not be expected in the near future and
would, in view of possible constitutional and political objections, 148 be likely
to increase rather than alleviate present difficulties. Moreover, such action
I45Brown, op. cit. supra note 141, at 205. See also FAIRMAN, op. Cit. supra note 6,
at 309 et seq.; Garner, Punishment of Offenders against the Laws and Customs of War
(1920) 14 Am. J. INT. L. 70, 85.
1462 LOWELL, THE GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 491, as quoted by WIENER, op. cit.
supra'note
89, at 144.
1
47WIENER, op. cit. .mpranote 89, at 150, stressing the analogy of this situation withthe historical solution of the problem of self-defense (reason for clemency rather
than48 justification).
1 Since the liability of federal soldiers 'and of militiamen in federal service should
be uniform and independent from peculiarities of the law of the state of involuntary
residence, federal legislation would seem desirable. Such legislation would probably
be held constitutional as corresponding to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940, 54. STAT. 1178 et seq. (1940) § 50 U. S. C. ApP. §§ 501 et seq. (Supp. 1943)
which purport to relieve members of the forces "in order to provide for, strengthen
and expedite the national defense" and "to enable such persons to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." Id at 1179, 50 U. S. C App. at § 510.
While under such federal legislation the regulation of the status of militiamen acting
as State troops would have to be left to the states, state regulation would probably follow any established federal pattern. If the law of tort and criminal liability of all soldiers should be deemed, however, to be within the exclusive competence of the several
states, only uniform acts could avoid the creation of new difficulties.
The constitutionality of state immunity statutes with regard to possible discrimination
has been rarely passed upon. The only New York case discussing the question did
not decide it. McLaughlin v. Kipp, 82 App. Div. 413, 81 N. Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't,
1903). See also Schroedel v. Bullard, 243 App. Div. 800, 278 N. Y. Supp. 12 (2d
Dep't, 1933); Carmody v. Davis, 241 App. Div. 88, 270 N. Y. Supp. 11 (2d Dep't
1934). For decisions from other jurisdictions, see O'Shee v. Stafford, 122 La. 444,
47 So. 764, 765 (1908), where the court, with regard to an immunity statute similar
to that of New York, denied the intention of the lawmaker "to exempt superior officers
from civil responsibility for torts, and to deny to the citizen for injury done him
'adequate remedy' by due process of law,' in plain contravention of article 6 of the
state Constitution." In Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924),
it was held that the Michigan statute providing that "troops . . .shall be privileged
from prosecution by the civil authorities, except by direct order of the governor, for
any acts or offenses alleged to have been committed while on . . . service" would be
unconstitutional if excluding civil accountability.
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may be dispensable and even undesirable in view of the unmistakable common-law trend towards a new liability rule satisfying most criticisms of
the present law.
In the field of criminal liability the defenses of mistake of fact and
coercion, together with jury Jeniency and a broader interpretation of lawful discretion, may gradually transform the present theory of full liability
for wrongful acts performed on duty into a theory of immunity limited
by a liability for palpably unlawful acts performed without coercion.
The common-law principle of full civil liability of soldiers is likely to
persist until federal and state governments succeed in safeguarding the
injured civilians' interests by the recognition of their liability for the "dangerous enterprise" of military action. Assumption of judgment by the state,
liability under respondeat superior and public defense are steps in this
direction. But while the balance of interests will, until such time, support
the classic rule of full liability, such balance may be upset in the soldier's
favor in cases of emergency and coercion, or in the injured person's favor
in cases of double recovery.
Although it is believed that most of the principles which, in the light
of the conclusions arrived at in this paper, should determine the law of
soldiers' liability, are being and will be adopted as common law, these principles will, for the sake of consistency and completeness, be presented in a
scheme of liability rules which probably could be fully realized only by
statute.
1.

Persons liable.

The limitation of immunity rules to militiamen is indefensible both from
the defendant soldier's and the plaintiff civilian's standpoints. If the militiaman has been immunized because of the emergency character of his
service, 49 such reason now obviously applies to an incommensurably higher
degree to federal soldiers. 150 The injured person is left entirely without
a remedy if injured by a militiaman, while if injured by a federal soldier,
he may have two claims-one against such soldier and, in certain property
149 See Note, Homicide by Soldiers (1916) 27 Am. L. NEws 7; ANN. Cas. 1914A
867. But militias have also been used for peaceful purposes, 'as e.g.: to compel a city
-council to discriminate against negroes [Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.
(2d) 1054 (1935)] to remove a state highway commissioner [Hearon v. Calus, 178
S. C. 381, 183 S. E. 13 (1935)], indeed, to control oil production [Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. ct. 190 (1932)]. See also N. Y. MILITARY LAW, §§ 111,
112.
150
The American soldier overseas remains subject to American law. See infra note
197.
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damage cases at least, another claim against the federal government.' 51
Any statutory reform of soldiers' liability should, therefore, establish equality
between federal and state soldiers. The question, how far civilian defense
workers should be included in such regulation, would seem to require ex52
tensive factual study.'
2.

Theory of liability.
Both the rule of the cormmon-law liability of federal soldiers and that
of the statutory immunity of militiamen have proved unsatisfactory, the
first rule because it .imposes undue hardship upon the soldier and impairs
military discipline, the second rule because it deprives the injured person
of his remedies and endangers civilian liberties. The principal difficulty in
devising a solution is caused, it is submitted, by the treatment of both
criminal and civil liability under one rule. If the distinct policies which
govern these liabilities and which under the present law have found expression chiefly in inconsistent results based on a varying evaluation of evidence,
were embodied in two independent rules of law, they could probably contribute much to a general solution of the problem.
(a) Criminal liability-While rules of civil liability are largely determined by the interests of the injured person, such interest may be disregarded in formulating a rule of criminal liability, 15 3 which should be fully
based on a theory of punishment. Under such a theory a wrongful act
committed in obedience to a military order or otherwise in the line of duty
will, as a rule, appear excusable chiefly in two situations:
(1) The soldier seems free of punishable guilt where he could reasonably assume that the order obeyed was legal or that he was otherwise under
a duty to act. In jurisdictions not recognizing the "palpable unlawfulness"
54
rule, the doctrine of mistake of fact or, indeed, that of mistake of law,'
151Supra notes 81 et seq.
152 At least one state has enacted an immunity rule granting protection to civilian
defense workers similar to that granted to members of the armed forces. IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1943) § 45-1513 provides in part that no "civilian defense worker
or member of any agency engaged in any civilian defense activity . .. shall be liable
for the death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of any
such activity." Civilians serving "with" the armed forces have in various other respects
been subjected to the same rules as soldiers. See e.g. REPORT, REcOMt1MENDATIONS AND
STUDIES OF THID N. Y. LAW REV. ComMit. (1943) 327 et seq. regarding military acknowledgments
and proofs.
53
'

See

UNITED STATES

AR Y RuLEs

OF LAND WARFARE, BASIc

FIELD MANqUAL

FM

27-10 (1940) § 347, infra note 191.
154The wider application of the defense of mistake of law has recently been urged
by Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea (1941) 8 U. OF Cn. L. REV.
641, in cases where "there has been misleading conduct for which the state should
fairly be held responsible" (Id at 683), in particular alsa "when officials in the execu-
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literally applied would furnish the common law basis for a more general
recognition of this defense, which so far has been largely limited to extrajudicial utterances.1 55
(2) The soldier should be free of responsibility when he acted under
circumstances amounting to duress or coercion, i.e. where other conduct
could not reasonably be expected from him.' 56
While the doctrine of coercion has not been generally accepted in this
field, certain indications pointing in this direction may be found in judicial
decisions and legislative acts as well as in legal writings. It has been stated
as a general proposition that coercion will excuse "for committing most,
if not all crimes except faking the life of an innocent person."''1 7 Broad
statements like this have, however, been limited to digests, annotations and
textbooks, 158 and have found judicial recognition only rarely, 159 and only in
cases of a justified fear of death or grievous harm. 160 In this form the
defense of coercion has also become a part of the statute law of several
states. 161
Something like a general theory of coercion seems to be recognized only
for the wife acting under the husband's order and for the child acting under
tive department have led the defendant to believe (erroneously) that certain conduct
is not illegal" (Id at 675). See also KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1933)

72.

For an example of the progress of the theory of relief against mistake of law even
in civil law fields see Act, Recommendation and Study relating to Restitution of
Monwy Paid Under Mistake of Law (1942) REPORT, REcOMENDATIONS AND STUDIES
OF THE N. Y. LAW Rv. Comm. 27 et seq,
155 See Lord Haldane in his testimony before the Select Committee on Employment

of Military in Cases of Disturbances, 7 Parl. Papers (1908) No. 236, p. 12, as quoted
by FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 310; Brown, supra note 23, at 206 et seq.; BIslrop,
op. 56cit. mspra note 126, at § 303.
1 3ee EHRENZWEIG, MISTAKE AND UNLAWFULNESS (IIRTUM UND RECHTSWIDRIGKEIT)
ZWEiG,

(Vienna
TORT

(Vienna
1936)
57

Mani 1931),
LIABILITY

FOR

ZENTRALBLATT (1930)
FAULT

Nos. 10, 11, note 158; EHREN-

(ScHULDHAFTUNG

IM

SCHADENERSATZRECHT)

246 et seq.

15 Note (1922)

16 A. L. R. 1470.

' 8See ibid.; Note (1904) 106 AM. ST. REP. 721; 8 R. C. L. (1929) 125, § 100;
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 384.
15 9 See WHARTON, id. at 514, n. 21; STEPHEN'S DIGEST ON CRIMINAL LAW, art. 31,
quoted in People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 471, 61 N. W. 861 (1895). Cf. M'Growther's

Case, Foster's Crown Law, 13; Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1892), expressly
rejecting the defense of compulsion.,
60
' See e.g. People v. Repke, supra note 159. Cf. WARTON, op. cit. supra note 158,

at 516, pointing out that "it would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield
himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up fear from or because of a
threat of a third person."*
's 1 See e.g. CAL., PEN. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 26 (8) providing that persons are
incapable of committing a crime (except a capital crime) "vho committed the act
. . . under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to
and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused." See also P. R. PEN.
CODE (1937) § 39 (10) ; CANAL ZONE CODE (1934) § 57 (j).
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the father's order. Thus it has been held that a wife is not liable for a tort
or minor felony committed in the presence and by the direction of her
husband. 1 62 While the position of the wife has become doubtful in view
of the changes which have taken place during the last decades in the general legal position of\ women, it may still be considered as the prevailing
law that a child may be excused for a crime committed by him in such
circumstances. 163
The applicability of the theory of coercion to crimes committed by sol64
diers at the command of their superiors has hardly ever been discussed.
The following dictum in the leading case of McCall v. McDowell'W seems
to have remained unnoticed:
• . . If the law excuses the wife on the presumption of coercion, for
what reason should it refuse a like protection to the subordinate and
soldier when acting in obedience to the command of his lawful superior?
The latter may be said to act-particularly in time of war-under
actual coercion ....
The certain vexation and annoyance, together with
the risk of professional disgrace and punishment which usually attend
the disobedience of orders by an inferior, may safely be deemed sufficient to constrain his judgment and action, and to excuse him for
yielding obedience to those upon whom the law has devolved both the
duty and responsibility of controlling his conduct in the premises.
The only case that could' be found which actually applies a theory of
coercion in a case of military obedience is that of Clark v. State.' 66 In
that ease, the Georgia court held that a soldier of the Confederate army
was not responsible for burning a house at the order of his superior, because "obedience or death are the alternatives in military government in
such cases. . . . the subordinate almost always acts under coercion; his
acts are the acts of others for which in the clear light of common sense,
he cannot be held answerable ..
In view of the scarcity of authority, it may be considered as significant
162Cassin v. Delaney, 38 N. Y. 178 (1868). See also
at 73.
63

-KENNY, op.

cit. mtpra note 154,

t See Note (1922) 16 A. L. R. 1470.
164Ibid. The note discusses the relation of commanding officer and soldier besides

those between parent and child, husband and -wife, and employer and employee, but
does not cite a single case discussing the question from the angle of coercion. However, isolated remarks indicating similar considerations may be found. See e.g. Note,
Liability for Torts of Military Personnel (1942) 55 HARV. L. IEv. 651, 654, enumerating among "the factors in deciding whether a subordinate is reasonable in obeying the
command of a superior," also "the severity of the punishment a court-martial can
impose."

Abb. 212, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235, No. 8,673 (C. C. D. Cal 1867).
16637 Ga. 191 (1867).
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that a recent federal case seems to assume a rule recognizing immunity
on grounds of compulsion in cases involving military orders. In Guigni v.
United States, 67 the captain and the crew of an Italian tanker were convicted of having !iolated a federal statute, which prohibits the injuring of
vessels engaged in foreign commerce, 68 by intentionally damaging the
main engine of their ship after Italy had entered the war. The court affirmed the judgment denying inter alia "immunity to the officers and crew
on the ground that they obeyed the orders of their employer through his
agent, the captain," because "anyone who wished could have escaped ashore
and sought sanctuary with the authorities, had he been so inclined, and thus
escape coercion."' 6 9
Since this theory is hardly borne out by American authority, it may be
permissible to trace it, partly at least, to foreign sources. It should be noted
that most European laws, while denying general immunity to one committing military acts in obedience to orders on grounds similar to those of
the American courts' 7 0 have recognized a defense of coercion. Thus it is
said in the leading treatise on French criminal law that:
...if the subordinate may fear to lose his life or his liberty by his refusal
to obey, he will be in a7 1 state of coercion and will be permitted to invoke irresistible force.'

Similar statements will be found for the German and Austrian law. The
recognition, by English as well as American writers, of the theory of com167127 F. (2d) 786 (C. C. A. .st, 1942).
16840 STAT. 221, 231 (1917), 18 U. S. C. § 502 (1940).
69
170
Guigni v. United States, 127 F. (2d) 786, 791 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).
1 See e.g. GARRAUD, PR9CIS DE DROIT CRMIINEL (14th ed. 1926) 291 et seq. stating
that under- French criminal law "an order from a civil or military superior cannot
justify an illegal act," while it is "reason for excuse where it has led the subordinate
to believe that he has not committed a crime," and while his punishment may be mitigated even in cases in which he "is aware of being an instrument for a crime." See also
HUGUENEY, DROIT PiNAL ET PROCiDURE P-NAL MILITAIRES (Paris, Sirey 1933) 396.
See also AUSTmRAN PEN. CODE (pre-national-socialist) §§ 535, 560-b under which the
order of a military superior does not exclude responsibility for criminal acts, while
disobedience of an unlawful order is free of military sanctions. But cf. Sack, Punishment of War Criminals and the Defense of Superior Order (1944) 60 L. Q. Rlv. 63,
who assumes that in "Europe" obedience to orders is generally a defense. For Italian
-law see in general BFTTIoL, L'ORDINE DELL'AUToRITA NFL DIRITTO PENALE. An excellent survey and discussion of South-American Laws will be found in TEJERA, LA DESO1ENCIA
(1933) 93.
71
' GARRAUD, op. cit. mipra note 170, at 292. As to the application of the compulsion provision of § 64 of the FRENcH CODE to crimes committed by enemy soldiers,
see Mdrignhac, De la Sanction des Infractions en. Droit des Gens (1917) 24 RivUE
GEN. DE DRorr INT. PUBL. 5, 53; Nast, Les Sanctions Pinales de 'l'Rntlvement par
les Allemands du Materiel Industriel (1919) 26 R9vuE GEN. Dt DRoIr INT. PUBL. 11,
123.
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pulsion with regard to the punishment of enemy soldiers under international law, seems particularly significant. 1 72 It may be assumed that even
the rule of the British Manual and the United States Rules of Land Warfare which deny the responsibility of soldiers for acts committed in obedience to orders-, is based on a theory of compulsion." 5
The principles just developed can be embodied in a statute in one of two
ways: either by the recognition of the defenses of reasonable mistake and
coercion, under a rule preserving the present common-law principle of
full liability, or by, the adoption of a principle of general immunity limited
by the absence of reasonable mistake and coercion.' 74 Malice as such should
probably not produce liability under either solution. 75
No special rule seems needed for negligent conduct where such conduct
consists of the negligent execution of a lawful order. Such order, of
course, cannot excuse. Where, on the other hand, the negligent conduct
as such (e.g. driving at an excessive rate of speed or against a red light)
was ordered by the superior, such conduct would be covered by any general
immunity rule.

172See e.g.
(1933)

76

LAMMASCH-RTTLER,

LEHRBUCH

94, 170

DES

OESTERR CHISCHEN STAFPRCHT S

(adding fear of loss of property); 1 LiszT-ScH InrD, LEHRBUCH DES
D-UTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS (26th ed. 1932) ; BIENENFELD, HAFTUNGEN ONE VERSCHULDEN (Vienna, 1933) 356, n. 12 with exhaustive references. See also KENNY, op. cit.
supra note 154, at 71. For the international law see Pollock, The Work of the League

of Nations (1919) 35 L. Q. REv. 193, 198; Eagleton, Punishment of War Criminals by
the 73United Nations (1943) 37 Amt. J. INT. L. 495, 497.
1 See infra notes 194 ff. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1-5th ed.) § 253, one
of the co-authors of the rule of the Manual, gives the following rationale for the similar

statement in his textbook: "The law cannot require an individual to be punished for an
act 74which he was compelled by law to commit."

1 This rule would be related to, though not identical with, the principle of "palpable
unlawfulness" embodied in the statutes of Massachusetts and Wyoming, supra notes
112, 113. A further limitation of the immunity rule could be achieved by the substitution of a subjective standard for the objective standard of these statutes. It might
also be desirable expressly to state in the statute the circumstances which would determine
the standard of reasonableness (such as the existence of an emergency).
' 75 See supra notes 50 et seq. Military discipline would seem sufficient to cope with
cases
of this kind.
7
3 6The following is a draft statute for the criminal liability of soldiers which would
seem adaptable for the general part of any state criminal code:
Military immunity. A member of the armed forces of the United States or any
of the several states or territories or the District of Columbia shall not be liable
criminally for any act done or ordel- given in the performance of his duty, excejt

if he knew or should have reasonably known that such act or order was unlawful; nor shall such person be, liable for any act done or order given in obedience
to an order, disobedience to which, in his reasonable belief, would have endangered

his personal safety or liberty.
[Presumptions as to reasonableness of knowledge and belief in defendant's favor may
be added for wrongs committed in emergencies.]
It might be argued that a rule of liability, based on a concept of acting within the
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(b) Civil liability-It has been pointed out that any statutory or common-law scheme of soldiers' civil liability will, in the absence of a system
of complete government indemnification for damage inflicfed by the military,
haveto resign itself to attempts at balancing the conflicting ipterests of the
soldier, who under a rule of full liability would face the dilemma between
submission to military or civil penalty, and the injured person, who under
an immunity rule would be deprived of his sole remedy. While the present
common-law rule of liability can probably be justified by the prevailing interest in civilian security in peacetime, the balance of interests would seem
to require the opposite solution in several situations: (1) where the wrong
was committed in conditions of emergency (battle and insurrection); (2)
where the soldier acted in obedience to an order.under circumstances amounting to coercion; (3) where the injured person is able'to recover (a) from the
person giving the unlawful order, or (b) from the government (under a
77
general or special indemnity statute) .1
3.

Problems of conflict of laws and internationallaw.
(a) Forces of sister state-Under the military laws of most states the
immunity provision seems to be applicable also where the wrong was committed outside such states. 11 8 Similarly, it can be assume-d that wrongs
committed by federal soldiers on foreign soil are governed by American
common law. 1 79 It i's
highly doubtful, however, in the absence of express
scope of duty, might invite interpretation similar to that of the "scope of employment"
doctrine of the law of respondeat superior. See e.g. Y. B. Smith, Frolic and Detour
(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 444. In fact, while the results in these situations are directly
opposite (grant and denial of remedy), interpretation of the "military duty" concept
with the help of this analogy was used only recently in the case of Kurnath v. State,
130 N. J. L. 87, 30 A. (2d) 892 (1943). Compensation under the Militia Compensation Law was denied to a member of the New Jersey National Guard, injured in an
automobile accident while returning to camp, because he was not injured "while on
duty or as the result of exposure incident thereto," these statutory words being interpreted as similar words had been interpreted uider the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
See in general Note (1944) 150 A. L, R. 1456.
1
77The following is a draft statute for soldiers' civil liability which takes as its
starting point the wording of the militia' laws granting full criminal and civil immunity to members of the state militia. Supra notes 91, 97.
Relief from civil liability. A member of the armed forces of the United States or
any of the several states or territories or the District of Columbia shall not be
liable civilly for' any, act done or order given in obedience to an order, disobedience
to which, in his reasonable belief, would have endangered his personal safety or
liberty. Nor shall such person be liable if and in so far as the person injured by
his act or order has a claim for indemnification against a government under any
public
or private act.
178See e.g. N. Y. MILITARY LAW § 114.
179See Cohn, The Problem of War Crimes T9 -day (1941) 26 TRANSA. OF THE Ga oius
Sop. 125, 132; Hyde, Putishment of War Criminals (1943) PROCEEDINGS OF THE Am.
Soc. OF INT. L. 39, 56; Wright, id. at 56. See also U. S. RuIms OF LAND WA&FARE,
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statutory provisions, what law applies to members of the militias of sister
states who commit a wrong within the host state, either while engaged
in legitimate fresh pursuit'80 or while occupied in that state at the request
of its governor.' 8 '
(b) Allied forces-The situation of allied forces is different from that
of members of the forces of sister states. It seems to be an established
rule of international law that allied forces are entirely exempt from the
jurisdiction of the host country. This principle, which was pronounced in
this country in an early statement of Chief Justice Marshall,' 8 2 has undergone certain limitations in iecent years. In fact, the existence of numerous
international treaties and national statutes seem§ to cast doubts on its general applicability under modern conditions. Tthe most important international agreement is that regarding the United States troops stationed in
Great Britain, which is embodied in an exchange of diplomatic notes (July
27, 1942) and in an act of Parliament.' 3 While Section 1(1) of that act
excludes, subject to certain limitations, criminal proceedings before any
British court against a member of the forces of the United States, the question of civil jurisdiction, par(icularly with regard to contractual and similar
debts, remains unsettled.' 4 If the civil jurisdiction of the host country
supra note 153, § 355, providing that certain common crimes, "if committed by an
American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only puniihable
as at home, but a more severe punishment. . . shall be preferred." The Versailles Treaty
art. 228, limited the prosecution of war crimes to enemy nationals.
' 8 0See § 6 of the Model Act Providing for Fresh Pursuit by Military. Forces, in
Bacon, The Model State Guard Act (1941) 10 FORDHAm L. REv. 41, 52; and e.g. LA.
GEN. STAT. 1939 (Supp. 1942) § 4505.43.
op. cit. supra note 37, at 27, 62.
McGOVERN,
81

See also BECWrrH-HOLLAND-BAcDN-

1Many states have made special provision for this eventuality in their militia laws.
See8 2e.g. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932). § 45.110.
' The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddem, 7 Cranch 116, 3 L. ed. 488 (U. S. 1812),
where the Supreme Court held that a public armed vessel of a friendly power entered
an American port on, the implied promise of exemption from the jurisdiction of the
local courts. Dicta to the same effect are contained in Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S.
509, 515, 24 L. ed. 1118, 1121, 1122 (1878) and Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 165,
25 L. ed. 632, 635 (1879) which, thougli involving troops of hostile powers, discussed
the rights of troops of friendly powers as well. See also King, Jurisdiction over
Friendly Foreign Armed Forces (1942) 36 Aas. J. INT. L. 539; Bustamente Code,
art. 299, in Convention of Priv. Int. L., FiAL AcT OF THE 6TH INT. CoNF. OF Am.
(1928) 16.
STATES
83

' Approved by the King, August 6, 1942; 5 & 6 Geo. 6,c.31. See Schwelb, The
Status of the United States Forces in English Law (1944) 38 Am.J. INT. L. 50;
Goodhart, The Legal Aspect of the American Forces in Great Britain (1942) 28
A. B. A. J. 762, Kuratowski, rnternationalLaw and the Naval,, Military and Air Force
Courts of Foreiqn Governments in the United Kingdom (1943) 28 TRANSA. OF THE
GRorius Soc. 1; Wigmore, The Extraterritorialityof the United States' Armed Forces
Abroad (1943) 29-A. B. A. J.121; Rheinstein, Military Justice, in War and the Law
(Charles
R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures), (1944) 161.
18 4 0n the civil liability of British and American forces in New Zealand, see Mc-
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is recognized, it might be held to include certain tort claims' 85 as to which,
too, the defense of obedience to orders might create nice problems of conflict of laws. 8 6
(c) Enemy forces-Enemy soldiers can be prosecuted before domestic
tribunals for the violation of "generally recognized laws and usages of
war," whether such violation constitutes an ordinary crime 8 7 or not. 8
The question by which law responsibility and penalty are to be determined
in such cases, will gain particular importance in the post-war trials of
enemy criminals pleading obedience to orders.
(1) If the crime was committed in occupied territory, the la'w of such
territory will probably be applied in determining the validity of the defense
of obedience. This principle was recognized in the Joint Communiqu6
of the Tripartite Conference of Moscow, November 1, 1943, where it was
announced that German war criminals would be sent back to those counGechan, Allied Armed Forces in New Zealand (1942) 18 N. Z. L. J. 209, 222, 234,
particularly with regard to the liability
of soldiers on leave. See also Note, Soldier and
the85Law (1933) 175 L. T. 141.
But see King, supra note 182, at 564 who, while urging that soldiers of foreign
countries should be responsible before the courts of the host country for contractual
debts, feels that it is "quite clear that no civil suit should be entertained by any
court of the host country against an officer, soldier, or sailor for any act or omission
in 8the
line of his duty."
1 6"Any defence to the action under the lex fori is available to the defendant, though
such a defence might not be valid by the lex loci." 3 JOHNSON, THEj CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1937)
395. See in general HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) 84, 100.
. 87 Garner, Punishment of Offeiders against the Laws and Cuistoms of War (1920)
4 Am. J. INT. L. 70, 73; Bartlett, Liability for Official War Crimes (1919) 35 L. Q.
REV. 177, 186; Cohn, supra note 178, at 128. This rule is also recognized in the German KRIEG SBRAUCH Im LANDKRIEGE. See Garner, 'Punishment of Offenders against the
Laws and Customs of War (1920) 4 AM. J. INT. L. 75. It is the prevailing opinion
that domestic legislation is not needed to establish a penalty for acts punishable under
international law. See ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup Ct. 1 (1942) ; Glueck,
By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried? (1943) 56 HARV. L. REv. 1059,
1071, 1082. Regarding the question of individual responsibility under international law
in general see" Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence
Contrary to the Laws of War (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 407. Kelsen, Collective and
Individual Responsibility in International Law with ParticularRegard to the Punishment of War Criminals (1943) 31 CAL. L. REv. 530.
1S8A mere technical violation "is a totally different thing from a crime" (Att'y
Gen. ii oral argument in the Saboteurs' Case, p. 125, as quoted by FAIRMAN, OP'. cit.
supra note 6, at 185). See also U. S. ARTICLES OF WAR, art. 12; RULES OF LAND WARFARE, BASIC FIELD MANUAL FM 27-10 (1940)
§§ 345 et seq. On the Saboteurs'
Case see e.g. Cushman, Ex parte Qufrin et al.-The Nazi Saboteur Case (1942) 28
CORNELL L. Q. 54; Note (1943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 631; Kaplan, Constitutional Linitatations on Trials by Military Commissions' "(1943) 92 U. OF PA. L. REv. 119;
FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 175 et sea. That enemy soldiers are not liable for
acts done in accord with the usages of civilized warfare, has been held repeatedly.
Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 25 L. ed. 632 (1879); Freeland v. Williams, 131
U. S. 405. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. 763 (1889) ; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 606, 24 L. ed.
1018 (1878).
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tries in which they have committed their .crimes "in order that they may
be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries.' 8 9 If, however, the crime was committed in the wrongdoer's own
country or on the high seas, 190 the enemy soldier will attempt to invoke
his own law' 91 which, having recognized an absolute defense of obedience
to orders even after the first world war,

92

will clearly do so now with its

sanctification of the leader's will, thus leaving responsible for the crimes
93
committed in the Fuehrer's name, only the Fuehrer himself.
'5 9 See FAIRMAN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 275. See also Garner, supra note 187, at 76;
RULES OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 188, § 285.
19 0See Garner, supra note 187, at 81. See also STORY, COMMENTAREES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1865) .566; DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5th ed., Keith, 1932) 777
et seq.
191 Cohn, supra note 179, at 128, 143: "Offenders can be punished only in accordance with the municipal law of the country where they committed the deed. . . . The
role of international law is confined to deciding the question whether an act, which
if there were no war, would be punishable as such, is excluded from punishment because it was an act of lawful warfare." See also Garner, supra iote 187, at 78, 80,
Glueck,
supra note 187, at 1062.
19 2 On the "Leipzig Trials" see Battle, The Trials Before the Leipzig Supreme
Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes (1921) 8 VA. L. REy. 1; Hyde, Punishinent of War Criminals (1943) PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC. OF INT. L. 39, 41, n.
10; Cohn, spra note 179, at 133 with further literature. The pre-nazi GERMAN MILITARY
PENAL CODE § 47 (2) declared responsible a subordinate obey an illegal order which
he knew to be unlawful. See MAYER, DER BINDENDE BEFEHLIM STRAFREcHT, BEIm7.
ZUR STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1930) 598, 605; A1%SON, DER BINDENDE RECHTWDRIGE
BEFEHL, 217 STRAFRECHTL. ABH. (1926). While the law does not seem to have been
changed, the Nazi literature seems to favor a stricter rule, particularly with regard
to S. A. men. HECKEL, ,WEHRVERFASSUNG UND WEHRRECHT DES GROSSDEUTSCHEN
REICHES (Berlin, 1939) 370. See in general SCHMIDT, MILITAERSTRAFRECHT (Berlin,
1936) 57; GLEISPAcH, DAs KRIEGSSTRAFRECHT (Stuttgart, Berlin 1941). For a more
conservative
view see DAMS, DER MILITAERISCHE UNGEHORSAM (Berlin, 1938) 68.
103Levy, The Law and Procedure of War Crime Trials (1943) 37 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1052, 1080 mentions the following recent German authorities: SCHMIDT, DIE
MILITAERISCHE STRAFTAT UND IHR TAETER (1936); GOESSER, DER MISSBRAUCH DER
DIENSTGEWALT (1939). See also VEDROSS, VOELKERRECHT (Berlin, 1937) 298; Dickinson, PROCEEDINGS OF AM. Soc. OF INT. L. (1943) 49. It has been urged frequently
that the axis war leaders should not be given the chance of a trial, neither purportedly
nor in fact. See Warren, PROCEEDINGS OF AM. Soc. OF INT. L. (1943) 51 et seq.;
Wright, PROCEEDINGS OF AMr. SOC. OF INT. L. (1943) 55; Finch, PROCEEDINGS OF AM.
SOC. OF INT. L. (1943) 57; Cohn, supra note 179, at 142 ("de inaximis non curat lex")
See in general Brierly, Do We Need an International Criminal Court (1927) 8 BRIT.
Y. B. INT. L. 81; Anderson, The Utility of the Proposed Trial and Punishment of
Enemy Leaders (1943) 37 AMt. POL. Scr. REv. 1081; Hoover, The Outlook for "War
Guilt" Trials (1944) 59 POL. Sci. Q. 40.
Often it may even go too far to hold officers liable 'for acts of their subordinates.
Garner, supra note 187, at 88. Cf. the President's declaration concerninz the punishment of Japanese officers (N. Y. Times, April 22, 1943, p. 4) and the Declaration of
London Jan. 13, 1942, regarding war crimes. Levy, The Lax1 and Procedure of War
Crime Trials (1943) 37 Am. POL. ScI. Rav. 1052, 1080: Finch, Retribution for War
Crimes (1943) 37 AM. J. INT. L. 81, 84; Munro, What Court Should Try Hitler
(1944) 94 L. J. 139.
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Surprisingly enough both the British Manual and U. S. Rules of Land
Warfare have adopted a rule Which would seem to permit such a plea.
The British Manual (1914, No. 443) provided that "members of the'armed
forces who commit such violations of the recognized rules of warfare as
are ordered by'their government 'r by their commander are not war criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy.' 94 The U. S. Rules of
Land .Warfare provide that "individuals of the armed forces will1 95 not
be punished . . ." in case they act ".' . . under the orders or sanction 9 6 of
97
their government or commanders."'
The validity of these rules, of which the Germans made good use after
the last war,198 has been frequently attacked. 99 They have been said to
have "no statutory or -other authority" 20 0 and to have been expressly rejected in the Washington treaty of 1922 concerning the use of submarines,
which was directed against any violator of its rules "whether or not such
'20
person is under orders of a governmental superior." '
194Thq most recent edition of this manual is dated 1939. None of the 32 amendments
published, has affected article 443. Levy, The Law and Procedure of War Crime Trials
Since 1929 (1943) 37 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1080; Hayman, The Manual of Military Law
and its Amendments (1943) 93 L. J. 350. See also MANUAL OF THE AIR FORCE (1933)
180. 5
19 The use of the word "will" instead of the word "can" in the British model (supra
note
194) seems to represent an important modification of the British rule.
9
' GThis addition to the rule as embodied in the British Manual (supra note 194)
would enable the enemy government to save its nationals from punishment even
by a blanket subsequent sanction. See Sack, Punishment of War Criminal and the
Defence
of Superior Order (1944) 60 L. Q. Rav. 63, 67.
197 Supra note 153. Cf. U. S. RULES OF LAND WARFARE (1917 ed.) § 366.
198See e.g. the case of Commander Neumann and The Dover Castle (German Sui.
Ct. 1921) (1922) 16 Am. J. INT. L. 704, in which the sinking of a hospital ship was
held justified, by superior order, with express reference to article 443 of the British
Manual (supra note 194). See Battle, supra note 192; Sack, supra note 196, at 67.
9

19 See e.g. PHILLIPS N,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND THE GREAT WAR

(1915)

260;

Bartlett, supra note 187, at 191; Higgins, Book Review (1922) 38 L. Q. Rav. 104;
2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht, 6th ed. 1940) 453; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1924, Higgins) 499; Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prevention
and Punishment (1917) 2 TRANSA. GROTrus Soc. 31, 46 denying to the Manual any
"statutory force or official authority," regarding it as "onlr intended for the guidance
of officers.'" See also 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR (1920)
§ 588; Pollock, The Work of the League of Nations (1919) 35 L. Q. REv. 193, 195;
Eagleton, Punishment of War Criminals by the United Nations (1943) 37 Am. J. INT.
L. 495, 497; Nast, supra note 171: Merignhac, supra note 171; Munro, War Criminals
and
20 0the Neutrals (1943) 93 L. J. 379, 380.
Lord Cave, War Crimes and their Punishment (1923) 8 TRANSA. GROTIUS Soc.
XIX, XXIII. But cf. Manner, supra note 187, at 417; Cohn, supra note 179, at 144.
The rule of the .Manuals owes its formulation probably to one of the co-authors,
Professor Oppenheim, who

advocated it

strongly

in 2 OPPENHEIIt,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW,
lst.-Sth ed. § 253. But cf. the most recent edition by Lauterpacht, supra note 199.
20
lArticle 3, in Supplement (1920) 16 Amt. JI INT. L. 57, 59. This provision has been
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Moreover, the general applicability of the enemy's law to his crimes was
denied as early as 1837 in the celebrated case of People v. McLeod. °2
In that case a British soldier who, obeying superior orders, had taken part
in the destruction of an American boat, was held responsible for the resulting loss of lives. The court, refuting defendant's argument "about the
extreme hardship of treating soldiers as criminals, who ...are, obliged, to
obey their sovereign," denied J"that a soldier is bound to do any act contrary to the law of nature, at the biddiflg of his prince," and added that,
if he were so bound, "he must endure the evil of living under a sovereign,
20 3
who will issue such commands."
Whatever be the authority invoked for this or similar limitations of the
applicability of the enemy's law to his defense of obedience, whether it be
20 4
the "law of nature," as in the McLeod case, or the "law of humanity,
20 5
the "Christian faith," a "higher law" of "international morality,"
or
simply the absence of an international law rule supporting the national
rule, 20 6 common opinion now seems to demand such limitation. It is less
clear, however, what legal rule should apply instead of the municipal law.
A "universal law of nations" 207 seems to be referred to in Section 355 of
the United States Rules of Land Warfare, dealing with "crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway
robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape. ' 20 It has been shown
that there is no rule recognized by "all penal codes" regarding the validity
of the defense of obedience to orders. Any new rule of international law,
on the other hand, possibly even a purportedly declaratory statement of
the "customary or conventional law," might be objectionable as an ex post
facto law. 20 9 The defense of obedience to orders has, therefore, recently
said to represent the abandonment of the rule of the Manuals by the United States
and Great Britain. Lord Cave, supra note 200, at XLII. This interpretation, however,
is open to doubt. It may be argued that a submarine commander violating the treaty
is denied the benefit of the rule of the Manuals only because of having committed
"an act of piracy" (Washington Agreement, article 3). See VElaRoss, op. cit. supra
note 193, at 298.
20225 Wend. 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328, (N. Y. 1841).
203Id. at 543, 37 Am. Dec. at 354. For a recent British criticism of this case see
Sack,
supra note 196, at 65.
20
4See Glueck, supra note 187, at 1079; Warren, supra note 193, at 53.
205
See Dickinson, supra note 193, at 47.
20
20oSa'ck, supra note 196, at 68.
7Glueck, supra note 187, at 1087; Dickinson, supra note 193, at 49.
208U. S. RmLEs oF LAND -WARFARE, supra note 153, at § 355. See e.g. the Code of
International Criminal Law drafted by Levitt, in 6 RgVUE INTERNATIONALE P-NITENTIAIRE
18 (cited, Cohn, supra note 179, at 141).
20
See Cohn, supra note 179, at 143; Eagleton, supra note 199; Garner, supra note
145, at 71, 72, n. 5; Hyde, supra note 192, at 43, n. 13.
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been called a "borderline case" between international and municipal regu21 0
lation.
For the assumption of a rule of international law it would seem not
to be indispensable, however, that such rule be recognized by the laws of
all civilized nations. Besides conventions and customs, a third group of
rules has come to be recognized as a source of international law: "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."211 These principles
212
for whose validity general acceptance is neither necessary nor sufficient,
are invoked in many situations in which the municipal laws have not developed uniform rules, as with regard to the theory of civil liability (fault
and causation) ,213 the scope of indemnification (dainnumn emergens and
lucrum cessans,2 14 direct and indirect causation),215 the doctrines of respondeat superior2 16 and of necessity.2 1
218

7

Even rules as to the amount of

interest
and as to periods of statutes of limitations2 9 have been laid
down by international tribunals in the absence of both agreement and uniform custom. While acceptance, by a majority of jurisdictions has been
210

Glueck, sztpra note 187, at 1087, n. 84. See also Kelsen, mipra note 187, at 556.
38 (3) of the STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE IN HAGUE. This rule is declaratory of existing law. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht, 5th ed., 1937) 28. Cf. Verdross, Les Principes Gniraimx
du Droit dans la Jurisprudence Internationale (1935) 52 RECUEIL DES Cours (Acadimie
212de Droit International) 195, 228. For a bibliography see id. at 250.
VERDROSS, VOELKERRECOT (Berlin, Springer, 1937) 76.
213
See Ripert, Les R~gles du Droit Civil Applicables aux Rapports Internationaux
(1933) 44 RECUEIL DES COURS (Academie de Droit International) 569, 608; Wise,
Tort at International Law (1923) 17 Aas. J. INT. L. 245; VERDROSS, op. Cit. .supra
note
214 "212, at 166; also 211, at 239.
See e.g. The Horace B. Parker (1926) 20 Ams. J. INT. L. 379; United States
v. 215
Guatemala (1930) 24 Am. J. NT. L. 799, 819.
See e.g. Mixed Claims Comm. of the United States and Germany, Adm. Dec.
No.
21 I (1924) 18 AM. J. INT. L. 175, 184.
2 6See e.g. Ripert, supra note 213, at 620.
lTSee e.g. Wolff, Les Principes Giniraux du Droit (1931) 36 RECUEIL DES COURS
(Academie
de Droit International) 483, 519.
21
8See The Wimbledon, Collection of Judgments, Series A, no. 1, at 32, fixing the
interest
rate at 6 per cent, as being fair "in the present financial situation of the world."
219
See King, Prescription of Claims in International Law (1934) 15 BRIT. Y. B.
INT. L. 82, 96, referring to a "general rule of jurisprudence"; Cavaglieri, II Decorso
del Tempo ed i suoi Effetti sui Rapporti GuiridiciInternazionali (1926) Riv. D I DtIRTo
INTERNAZIONALE 169, 182, invoking "una di quelle generali massime di guistizia, di
diritto naturale, di equita. . ."; Bluehdorn, Le Fonctionnment et la Jurisprndence des
Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (1932) 41 RECUEIL DES COURS (Academie de Droit Inter213Article

national) 141, 195, quoting the following statement of the Franco-Bulgarian Tribunal:
"Positive international law has not yet established a precise rule generally adopted as
to the principle and the duration of prescription. . . yet the principle appears as a
rule of the positive law recognized by all jurisdictions; it is but the expression of a
great principle of peace which is the basis of the common law as well as of all systems of civilized jurisprudence." (translation).
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said to be the criterion applied in such cases,220 it would seem that equity
and the observation of prevailing trends are the real forces determining
the decision.
It is submitted that the validity of the defense of obedience to orders
should and could be determined according to such "general principles."
So much seems clear, that both common-law 221 and pre-axis civil law jurisdictions deny criminal as well as civil immunity for wrongs committed in
obedience to orders, while recognizing certain exceptions to this general
rule. These exceptions may be classified roughly in two groups: (1) The
soldier who could reasonably assume, when obeying an unlawful order,
that such order was lawful, will.be relieved of his liability, under a theory
2 22
of mistake of fact, mistake of law, or under an independent principle.
(2) He will not be held liable if he obeys an unlawful order under actual
compulsion. 22 While there may be some doubt as to whether these exceptions apply equally to criminal, and civil cases, and as to whether their
existence must be proved by the plaintiff or by the defendant, it would
seem -that these exceptions have been recognized widely and frequently
enough to constitute "general principles" of international law as well as
224
guides for the future development of the common law of this country.
220
22 1

See Verdross, supra note 211, at 211.

1n view of its philosophical basis, the common law would seem to have special
significance in the ascertainment of general principles of international law. Both these
principles and the rules of the common law rest "upon natural justice." Lansing, Notes
on World Sovereignty (1921) 15 Am. J. INT. L. 13, 23, 27. See e.g. Bowditch v.
Boston,
101 U. S. 16, 19, 25 L. ed. 980, 981 (1879).
222
See the common law rule of palpable illegality, supra pp. 183, 197, 202.
2 23
1t has been pointed out that this rule has not only found wide recognition in civil
law jurisdictions (supra p. 208) -and has probably been the basis of the immunity
rule of the British Manual and the U. S. Rules of Land Warfare (supra p. 209), but
that
it has been applied as valid law in several American cases (supra p. 207).
2 24
The proposed substitution of a principle of liability in the absence of reasonable
mistake and coercion, for the principles of general immunity and general liability
(with or without the defense of apparent lawfulness) seems appropriate in those
post-war cases in which obedience to order will be claimed as a defense by common
as well as by war criminals. It is probably neither desirable nor feasible to convict
all subordinate axis officials who could have recognized the unlawfulness of their
criminal actions. But punishment seems justified, where such officials, according to
standards to be developed by the tribunal, could have reasonably been expected to disobey unlawful orders, i.e., where they did not act under coercion. War crime tribunals
will be reluctant to assume coercion, where entire units, though not the individual
defendant, could have been expected to refuse obedience, as in wanton killings of children
and prisoners.

